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THE MEANING OF THE "NEW CRITICISM"

In that [the Italian], as well as in every other language, the easiest books are generally the best; for whatever author is obscure and difficult in his own language, certainly does not think clearly. This is, in my opinion, the case of a celebrated Italian author, to whom the Italians, from the admiration they have of him, have given the epithet of *Il divino*: I mean Dante. Though I formerly knew Italian extremely well, I could never understand him: for which reason I had done with him.—Letter of Lord Chesterfield to his son.

BETWEEN THE last war and the present one, someone has been tampering with the springs of Helicon. Hippocrene and Aganippe are scarcely considered so limpid as they were once reputed to be. A new criticism has brought tools to probe well below the surface and has found toad skins, fenny snakes, blind worm's stings, and general sediment enough to discredit the opinion that the springs of poetry in their depths run entirely clear. All this has puzzled or even troubled a good many persons who have wondered from a distance what the engineers in charge of the recent investigations have been about. This much is certainly true: Messrs. I. A. Richards, F. R. Leavis, William Empson, and the rest of the group active for the past two decades or so at the University of Cambridge, with Mr. T. S. Eliot as an invaluable semi-professional consultant, have undoubtedly evolved a criticism as genuinely new as such things can well be and have demanded some radical revisions of common views of poetry. It matters little that the metaphysician has ignored these common views together with most of the customary trappings with which criticism had for some time been hung. The wholesale sloughing of large sections of a quite basic outlook, however gradually and quietly accumulated, is likely to be of concern to him.

The present paper is an attempt to answer some of the questions concerning the new criticism which the metaphysician might raise.

Although Mr. Eliot, somewhat differently situated than Mr. Richards, is of equal importance, Richards is recognized as the central figure around whom most of the "new criticism" revolves. He takes his own philosophical bearings more closely and turns more frequently and decisively to philosophical speculation than the others of the school. The position which he occupies is undoubtedly due in large part to his astuteness as a reader, his ability as a teacher to inspire others, and his mastery of a prose style built upon the English language and its idiom and metaphor. And in his rôle of philosopher this last in particular is important, for it gives Richards' philosophical excursions, which have become more and more lengthy and important, a life and urgency long absent from a more artificial tradition. But Richards' special appeal—and his appeal is admitted even by those who profess an initial dislike for his work¹—is his knack for asking and answering the pertinent questions, the questions which at this time seem particularly important. Such a knack is a matter of the philo-

¹ For example, John Crowe Ransom in his *The New Criticism* (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1941), p. 4.

sophical milieu into which one is born and of one's own special background of interests within that milieu. With the philosophical milieu, then, as it manifested itself some years ago in criticism and poetical theory, and with the general place of the new criticism in that milieu, we can begin.

LITERARY CARTESIANISM

Not only philosophy, but the study of poetry and of all literature has had its Cartesianism too. The coloring of the first modern philosopher's thought is visible in almost every current flowing into our century from the early eighteenth, when the Cartesian dichotomy, having poisoned the sources of thought "in the high bogs of the mountains," was running into all the valleys below and seeping by little and little into the entire land. To filter out the suppositions which the dichotomy has introduced everywhere is a long and tedious process and not always successful. Many of us still have penance to do for viewing St. Thomas through glasses steeped in the Cartesian dye.

The starting within (however we got there) and working out, with the consequent disjunction of "mind" and "matter," led inevitably to a treatment of "ideas" which was to have its effect on poetical theory and literary criticism, and all the more so because of the quite human weakness for the over-simplification which Descartes proposed. Often before, the idea and not being itself had taken the measure of knowledge, only now it was to enjoy its most phenomenal success of all time, first as part of a method soon destroyed by Locke and then as persisting in its implications even among its destroyers.² And poetical theory, never very strong philosophically, deriving in great part from medieval logicism and in part more directly from the Cicero-Quintilian grammatical confusion, was quite ready to soak up whatever Cartesianism it could.

There is a general suspicion abroad that the rhetoric and literary criticism in the schools of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was dry to the point of being dusty, and a cursory examination of the classroom texts confirms the suspicion. Matters were rather distressingly obvious, and somehow distressingly wrung with logic. Much of this can be traced to the all-pervading influence of the Cartesian idea, which we must remember was sired in mathematical unfeeling. Blair, for instance, the dean of the late rhetorical tradition, gives us some evidence:

Simple expression just makes our idea known to others; but figurative language, over and above, bestows a particular dress upon that idea; a dress, which both makes it to be remarked, and adorns it.³ The loose connection with the idea which the "dress" implies exists as a function of the mind-body relationship of Descartes. Blair in

² See Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937) and *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1939). These two books have been fallen back on throughout the following discussion.

³ Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, ed. by Abraham Mills (Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, n.d.), p. 147. These *Lectures* were originally published in 1783.

general adopts what we may call a moderate position: figures are not unnatural, they express something. But there is no close inter-action between them and ideas. They are dress. Similarly, an American author, who tells us in his preface that he follows Blair, Whately, Beattie, Campbell, and Watts, writes in an 1846 textbook:

Q. What do you understand by poetry?

A. Lively and striking combinations of thought, expressed in language arranged, for the sake of harmony, according to certain rules.⁴

Here again the dichotomy asserts itself: thought combines not with language but with thought; language has its own rules.

I do not propose to make these writers ridiculous. Blair held a highly respected position and read his lectures for twenty-four years in the University of Edinburgh. His influence persisted pretty directly for over a hundred years after the publication of the *Lectures* in 1783, and the book remains useful in many respects. But critical writing in this tradition appears singularly incompetent to come to grips with any other than the abstract meaning of the poem. In a passage which will be recognized as typical, commenting on King's exquisite "Exequy on the Death of a Beloved Wife," Boyd has such things as this to say:

What a "last good night" is this! and oh! what a *one* "good morrow!" to last for eternity, when such partners awake from the same bed, in the resurrection of the just! Is there the "man born of a woman," who has loved a woman, and lost whom he loved, and lamented whom he has lost, that will not feel in the depth of his spirit all the tenderness and truth of these old-fashioned couplets! I dare not offer a comment upon them, lest I should disturb the sanctity of repose which they are calculated to inspire!⁵

Faced with the complexity of organization in the poem, the commentator throws up his hands. Instead of explaining the poem, he tries registering an emotional reaction, rather less successfully than the poem itself does.

This kind of comment is not universal, but it is the staple of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century criticism. When discussion of poetry rises above this in this period, it does so by shifting its attention elsewhere, not by any minute account of poetic organization. Works which have gained reputations for themselves, such as Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition* and Wordsworth's preface to the *Lyrical Ballads* or Shelley's *Defense*, have little value as explanations of poems. For the Cartesian mentality prevails: although the doctrine may be whispered and sometimes only supposed, the absolute and ultimate referent of meaning is the idea, not being. Poetry is strung down from ideas, and emotion or sense-knowledge, admittedly present in the poem, come in somewhat surreptitiously, being inexplicable under the terms in which the ideas are analyzed. To speak of these other things as integral to the organization of the ideas themselves would be profanation of the intellect and perversion of language.

⁴ James R. Boyd, *Elements of Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* (8th ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1887), p. [113]. From the number of editions we can judge the popularity of this textbook.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

THE RÔLE OF MATTER IN THE CONCEPT

The critics' success—for the better commentators must have met with success—came because the audience stood on the same ground as they did. This was the age of ideas, clarity, and definition; it would have thought strangely of Thomas Aquinas' persistent and calculated use of judgments, such as *quod quid est esse* (the what it is to be) in place of a simple term. In the reduction of the judgment to a mathematical equation, the very heart had been taken out of any understanding of the eduction of the intelligible from matter. Such an understanding does not depend merely on recognition of the fact that concepts are associated with phantasms. The understanding is defective if it does not observe that, however they may be handled in mathematics and minor logic, the most abstract abstractions always come to us in ways which reflect their origins out of material existents. They are not things hung together on pieces of string, but things found in judgments, the predicate of which always comes as form (more abstract) to its subject as matter (more concrete). Abstractions cannot be preserved and packaged, but are known and used only as they are being drawn in some way or other out of matter.⁶

There is a tempting simplicity in dealing with things the Cartesian or idealistic way, where a thing is simply its definition,⁷ because of the intellectual clarity and manageability thereby had and because of the easy distinctions we can make between our "ideas" considered as dependent upon definition. But this tempting clarity and distinctness are not goals to be achieved equally by all concepts, nor for that matter by all judgments, if we regard the real origins of these things. Clarity and distinctness are variable as between concepts and with reference to any one concept, growing less as we keep closer to matter and increasing as we move away. For prime matter, which forms the basis of distinction between material things, is the principle of unintelligibility and hinders intellectual clarity and distinctness. (It is precisely the distinction, based on matter, between this individual and that individual of a species which I have difficulty in grasping intellectually and for which I fall back on the senses.) Conjunction with and separation from matter come about variously, but always in so far as there is conjunction, there is some confusion and indistinctness between concepts, some intellectual unmanageability, and in so far as there is separation, there is distinctness and clarity. Moreover, since *entia rationis* originate with material things, although we can consider other points about them than their persistent material reference, to consider *entia rationis* entirely and adequately, we must remember

⁶ See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8: "Praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam; et similiter differentia ad genus: ex materia autem et forma fit unum simpliciter" (the predicate is related to the subject as form to matter; and similarly [specific] difference to genus: and from matter and form there results an absolute one); see also *In I Periherm.*, lects. 5 and 10; and cf. *S. T.*, I, 58, 2. resp.; *Sum. c. Gent.*, I, 55; *S. T.*, I-II, 113, 7 ad 2; *In I Sent.*, d. 19, 5, 1, 2. Cf. Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic*, trans. by Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), pp. 90-92, 86-90; and Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "The To Be Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, Vol. XVI (1940), pp. 230-54.

⁷ Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 153 ff.

their connections with matter and their consequent varying in clarity and distinctness. We must remember, for example, that the concept of man had by an adult differs from that had by the same person when he was a child as by greater experience it is in various ways freed from the matter of the existents from which it originates. Likewise, two concepts of species in different genera are more clear and distinct than concepts of the two genera themselves because genus is achieved by generalizing abstraction, which regards the concept and ultimately the thing in function not of its formal or unifying principle but rather of its material or diversifying principle—the principle which looks to what reference the thing has to that which is unlike it. In this way my concepts of rational animal and of the American elm are more clear and distinct from one another than my concepts of animal and plant. Moreover, a concept of a chimpanzee can be further developed or perfected than that, let us say, of a yeast plant, because the anthropoid apes are higher in the hierarchy of being and thus less submerged in matter. Concepts, therefore, may be undeveloped and indistinct or developed and clear, or they may be generic and indistinct or specific and clear, and they may represent things more or less knowable in themselves and thus be capable of attaining more or less clarity and distinctness. In all this their various relations with matter are in evidence.

But our concepts have far more traffic with matter than this. Not only are they used in judgments, which reflect inevitably in their structure the origin of our knowledge in things made up of matter and form, and not only are the concepts in such judgments variously related in themselves to matter, but a further special relation with matter is set up artificially by the use of the spoken word. A large number of our abstractions are made and much of our knowledge is achieved under the guidance of speech. But concepts are not carried *on* words. They are submerged in the matter of words and must be re-abstracted from them, reclaimed from this new matter. The study of the use of words, of communication or symbolism or semantics, involves *the study of an abstractive process*.

INDUCTION AND THE ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF MEANING

The Cartesian-Kantian dualism had obscured the fact that concepts and judgments cannot be prepared in one mind and handed like tokens to another. In their movement from intellect to intellect, they must pass through matter *en route*: the vehicle which bears from intellect to intellect the judgment compounded of logical matter and form is itself a material thing and, being such, can present any meaning, any signification, which it may have only as something to be abstracted from it. Definition cannot relieve us of this necessity, for ultimately the communicative value of any utterance is derived not from definition but from induction. I can push the inductive process back, as I might do by defining photosynthesis as the "formation of carbohydrates in the chlorophyll-containing tissues of plants exposed to light," and each of the resulting definition components can be again defined, and each of the resulting components again. At any point, however, I may find it practicable to break off this process and substitute one of pointing, and at some time or other I must do so. For instance, I might show a series of plants in sufficient quantity for

you to know what the word "plant" in my definition meant by your performing some sort of induction. I could even have substituted for the definition in the first place by showing the process of photosynthesis—not, it is true, an easy thing to do. Definition is often, as here, the simplest way to exhibit the meaning of a word, but definition must stop somewhere and means nothing at all unless it does stop. Somewhere or other, in establishing the meaning of my terms, I must simply point and say that "this and this and this and this" or "what you see here and here and here and here" is what this word means. And it is only in terms of such pointing that every word in a definition has its significance and that definition is possible at all.

Because of the increased complexity of connections, this process of abstracting meaning from words is much more involved and devious than other abstraction. We may form the concept of a man directly by abstracting from beings with which we come in contact. But we attach meaning to words by dropping out successively parts of contexts in which the words occur. Let us suppose ourselves learning the meaning of the word "man" for the first time by the inductive process on which all meaning depends. Hearing the sound, supposing that we realize the speaker's intention to use it significatively, we will know in the first instance that it refers to something in the context, taking this as the whole set of things to which we can at that time be attentive. The next time the word is repeated, the context has changed in great part, and in our seeking after meaning we can eliminate whatever does not recur in the second context. Man will be included always in what possibilities for meaning remain, but so will many other meanings. There will be a time, perhaps, when we will know from an accumulation of contexts that the word includes in its designation a man without being sure that it does not designate a clothed man or a tall man, as "boor" designates a man who behaves in certain ways. It will be only after a long succession of separate contexts that we know the more limited meaning of the term. Here is a movement from the less determined to the more determined, but the movement does not follow the way of abstractions which are had from things and not from words. In dealing with words I am moving from the less determined to the more determined by freeing my concept from a set of material things with which it is surrounded quite haphazardly. These haphazard surroundings cling to the word and are only gradually eliminated.⁸ They can only be recognized as irrelevant to the meaning by the fact that they sometimes do not occur when the word is used; for definition is not ultimate, induction is our last resource, and therefore, ultimately, I cannot *tell* you which things are irrelevant. If, after the meaning of a word is more or less fixed, certain elements of the context tend to recur with the word, the meaning of the word will inevitably shift, for these are our clues, and we must follow them.

Moreover, since apart from their significative connections words have existences of their own, the relations of the sounds of words among themselves and with other things enter into the context as determinants of meaning. This is especially true when we are dealing with words which signify other than physical objects and which

⁸ See I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 11 and 34.

must therefore receive their determination by complex indirect ways of pointing. Thus "flimmer," independently of its use as a word, is associated in sound with "shimmer," "glimmer," "slimmer," "dimmer," "flimsy," "swim," "skim," and the whole *fl*-group of "fluid," "flow," and so on.⁹ Consequently, if we use the word "flimmer" in a sense like "flicker," we will find ourselves unable to hold it to the exact meaning of "flicker" because the "shimmer-glimmer-slimmer" group of words, forming always a part of the context, will exert their pull. "Flimmer" will always point to them, and "flicker" to "flick," "nick," "quick," "prick," "tick," and so on. And because meaning has developed for us from a less to a more determinate thing and there is no particular place for it to stop, as long as there are clues for determining meaning further, we will follow them.

Since words thus form parts of contexts for one another, they hold their meanings to a certain extent by a kind of balance of power. The introduction of new words will disturb this balance and cause a shift in the signification of all related words. If the word "flimmer," for instance, began to be used to any great extent, the meaning of "flimsy" would undoubtedly shift somewhat. The kind of tyranny exercised over our intellectual life by these connections is extreme. Certain concepts simply cannot be expressed, as we know, in one language or another: every word or group of words we select is pulled out of line by uncontrollable parts of the context. Moreover, many if not most of our concepts are developed under the discipline of the material parts of words, because we often form or perfect concepts as words call for them, with the result that we tend even to order concepts among themselves according to the whimsicalities of the words with which they are associated.

I am aware how shocking this is to the dictionary mentality, which, growing up with the dictionary itself after the Cartesian success, regards meaning as cohering to words by definition, whereas more often it coheres by a more or less direct pointing process. The dictionary mentality leads to the butchery sometimes done in the name of denotation and connotation. For example, "flimmer," being defined by the dictionary as "to glimmer; flicker,"¹⁰ must, to this sort of mind, signify directly (denote) these things or, at best, a generic meaning which they share, and must signify anything else indirectly (by connotation). If, on the other hand, we allow signification to rise more directly from the senses, "flimmer" does not mean directly either "glimmer" or "flicker," and, though it means something like both, its meaning is far more specific than what generic meaning they may share. But for the Cartesian mind, again, this traffic with the senses would be betrayal of the intellect.

All this is not to deny that by a special effort we can, of course, handle words as strictly symbolic for purposes of abstract thinking, although the amount of effort necessary and the notable failure of many attempts at this use of language should not be minimized. Fixed by firm convention and shored up by the long series of definitions which are the first supports of any scientific discussion, this language

⁹ "Flimmer" is Richards' example, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language* (2nd ed.; Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1941), p. 967.

is as determined, as invariable, as high in formal and as low in material content as it is possible to make it—so much so that we can afford to disregard its material content and study the workings of concepts and judgments by the logic of demonstration. But even this language exists ultimately in terms of pointing and is notably more manageable in the physical and mathematical sciences, where the pointing can be carried off easily, than in philosophy, where it must be far more skillfully managed.

Moreover, the very abstract meanings of words have their own way of entering into other relationships with material existents through their connections with the person uttering them. Thus, the fact that under certain circumstances I express certain things is itself pregnant with meaning dependent upon the abstract—as well as other—signification of what I give utterance to. Here again the concept becomes less intelligible, less clear and distinct in meaning as it is submerged in the material existents surrounding it. Its meaning in this way holds itself in terms of these existents and this meaning to become intelligible must be abstracted again. Thus the fact that I remark about the coldness of the weather may mean in its whole material context that I am anaemic or hypersensitive or a meteorologist or interested in garden produce or nervous about something to say. The abstract sense of my statement about the weather becomes ambiguous, that is, loses in intelligibility as it is pushed down into the material context, though a new meaning of the whole is abstracted. In this way dramatic situation enters poetry.

Some words are used only for such communication as this and consequently retain an indetermination and lack of intellectual clarity in themselves. Interjections, for instance, such as "Well!" or "Indeed!" are not used in themselves for an abstraction, but are rather imbedded in a whole set of material circumstances so that, if you will, you may make an abstraction from the whole set and conclude by this abstraction that the man who utters them is shocked or delighted or surprised or agrees with you or thoroughly disagrees with you, as the case may be. And as words other than expletives are used more or less for expletive purposes, they partake more or less of this function.

THE LOGIC OF POETRY

Now because concepts exhibit these various connections with matter in the intimate ways we have observed, poetry is possible. The unity of a poem, which comes home to us at least from time to time as we read poetry, is not explainable in terms of the organization of the "ideas" in their own right. Such a unity as we know in reading a poem would, if it were strictly idealogical, require the strong (necessary) connections of the logic of demonstration, for in terms of this logic abstractions find their organization. The logic of rhetoric is more slippery, less unified: the rhetorical syllogism is an enthymeme, a syllogism which argues from probability and does not come to an absolutely certain conclusion, but to one conclusion where another or others are possible. The enthymeme has its unification in being ordered to the unity of a concretely realized act rather than in a strictly logical structure. The logic of poetry is still more sliding, for the concepts here are merely juxtaposed, united as St. Thomas

says by our supposing (*existimatio*).¹¹ We have not in poetry even the justification of the historian for uniting concepts. The historian lacks logical necessity but has contingent actuality on his side: Washington *need* not have been president, but he was. In poetry we have a very weak analogue of logic and no contingent actuality at all, for it makes no difference in our poem whether the man we call president existed or not. How, therefore, are we justified in setting down a judgment, let alone in setting down several judgments and expecting them to cohere? And if the abstractions in a poem do cohere—and we know they do because we have direct experience of a poem's unity—how do they? The answer, of course, is that the poem holds abstractions in its unity through their connections—intimate, as we have seen, and manifold—with the more material elements which enter into it. Ultimately, as the logic of rhetoric is unified by being resolved into action, the logic of poetry is unified in a particular act of contemplation, an act peculiar to man and involving, in unusually close cooperation, the interplay of the sensory and the intellectual that is necessary for the kind of knowledge which must be had by a being dealing with the intelligible existing in matter.

Throughout all the steps in communication traced here we must remember the importance of the imagination as the internal sense giving the highest organization on the sensory level to the perceptions with which our awareness of things begins. Every time the intelligible is brought forth from matter in any way at all, the imagination plays its part not merely as accompanying the concept but as forming the direct material out of which the concept is drawn. In its reproduction of the outside world, it shares in its own way this world's ambiguity and unintelligibility, but serves also as a point at which, on an infra-intellectual level, the conceptual can be made into a kind of unity. Hence its importance in the poetic economy.

But neither this notion of the imagination nor any of the other notions involving the interplay of the material and the intelligible can be assimilated to the Cartesian intelligence whose suppositions—perpetuated by the devotion of the nineteenth century criticism to Platonism—have entered so deeply into the thought of the past two centuries.¹² Only for him who sees the emergence of the intelligible out of material being, who realizes that the principle *nihil in intellectu quod non prius aliquomodo in sensibus* is to be understood *simpliciter et non secundum quid*, that the *nihil* means *nihil*, that the abstract concepts which words represent, and the knowledge that words do represent the concepts, and the very connections of the strictest logical sort are first, in some way or other, derived by the senses from material things and maintain always some commerce with the material—only

¹¹ See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I. 2. 1356a-b; Thomas Aquinas, *In I Anal. Post.*, lect. 1.

¹² The intellectual climate might be invoked to explain the Scotism of Gerard Manley Hopkins mentioned, among other places, in G. F. Lahey, *Gerard Manley Hopkins* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 131-32. In a person of Hopkins' intellectual vigor, his Scotism can hardly be regarded as simply an aberration. With the artist's interest in saving the individuality of things (cf. his "inscape"—and his correspondence is full of this interest), when Hopkins saw the individual perishing in the Cartesian-idealistic chill, he turned to the only other alternative which then offered and became Scotist.

for him who realizes this when he embarks on poetical criticism can poetry be other than either an inexplicable movement of matter or an exercise in dry logic. Richards and his generation were born into a world where a large residue of Cartesianism had blocked the approach to poetry which such a realization would have made possible. But the residue was being eaten away. Like all partial representations of reality which propose themselves as complete, it wore poorly in contact with being for whose contact it was not prepared. Aspects of things not manageable by the old dichotomy or the occasionalism and materialism and idealism to which it gave rise were beginning to assert themselves. One of these was the problem of poetic organization. The particular pertinency of the inquiries of Richards and his colleagues comes from the fact that they took up the question of "meaning" but turned their investigations toward the neglected material side under the discipline of the now successful laboratory psychologies at a time when the Cartesian breakdown enabled them to flirt with the possibility of there being more to reality than materialism would allow—or at least to act as though there might be.

REORIENTATION UNDER THE "NEW CRITICISM"

Since dualism had hoisted the idealistic balloon well out of sight and mind, it was necessary to start from the ground again. Because the problems of poetic organization, as we have seen, are concerned to a large extent with infra-intellectual activities, the neurologist's acquaintance with the sense life provides a starting point for a solid analysis of poetry. Neurology and allied psychological sciences were paramount among Richards' early interests, and at the very time when his appeal was growing among one group of readers, his concern with "attitudes" and "impulses" was annoying those who recalled the material polarity, the brashness, and the vagaries of the laboratory psychologies. Richards has since moved far from the neurological substitute for metaphysics. As Mr. Ransom has remarked, he is "essentially, or ultimately, an honest reporter," and "honest nominalist-positivists in the course of their careers will come to have more commerce with the metaphysics than they had contemplated."¹³ Because the new criticism grew out of the laboratory, it could consider problems of poetical unity, and it was not long before the investigators following these problems, where connections between the material and abstract are so much in evidence, found themselves outflanking the assumptions of the materialist and idealist. Thus Richards appeals in 1929 for "a closer contact with reality, either directly, through experience of actual things, or mediately through other minds which are in closer contact," and in 1935 he offers his book in the dedication "for help in preferring the actual to the abstract."¹⁴ Richards owes much to his persistent interest in Coleridge's theories of the imagination, and his two latest books¹⁵ give the strongest confirmation to those

¹³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 10 and 6.

¹⁴ I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929), p. 251, and *Coleridge on Imagination* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935), dedication, p. [v].

¹⁵ *How To Read a Page* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1942) and *The Republic of Plato: A New Version Founded on Basic English* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1942).

who have long believed they discerned in his thought the direct vision necessary to the metaphysician.

As the "new criticism" took over the direction of affairs, the subjects made to bear the weight of its investigations were such things as metaphor, "meaning" in its largest sense and various manifestations, meter considered not as a mathematical abstraction but as a nervous stimulant, ambiguity in poetry, and the behavior of words in conversational usage—with questions of imagery running through all these things. These subjects lie on the borderline between sensory apprehension and intellection, and thus, although its separate parts have other aspects, in its new respect for the organization of poetry in terms of "total meaning"—that is, in terms of its total communication, sensory and intellectual, regarded as a unit—the new criticism differs from what had gone before and becomes a single movement. Changes in the critical evaluation of existing authors and in particular the dethronement of Milton and his "architectural" style and of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century romantics, as well as the recovery of "metaphysical" poetry, can, it seems to me, be related to these interests of the new criticism, as can much of Eliot's critical theory.

All the critical parings scattered about by the new thought yield in point of practical importance to Richards' "four kinds of meaning," which have through various text books become quite common property, and which pretty well include many of the other subjects of the new investigations. The "four kinds of meaning" are (1) sense or abstract meaning, (2) feeling or the attitude of the speaker toward his material, (3) tone or the attitude of the speaker toward his audience, and (4) intention or aim, conscious or unconscious.¹⁶ In the second and third, and to some extent in the fourth of these meanings, Richards in dealing directly with the infra-intellectual components of words. The four meanings or functions, as their discoverer sometimes designates them, are important because they include the total meaning¹⁷ of discourse (sensory or concrete and intellectual meanings taken together), grouping the concrete handily around two referents and giving a special place to the speaker's intention or ultimate purpose. Having placed under "sense" the function of words in communicating abstract meaning, Richards considers in Functions 2 and 3 the direct or non-abstractive communications of language, grouping under "feeling" the "whole conative-affective aspect of life—emotions, emotional attitudes, the will, desire, pleasure-unpleasure and the rest" as these things are conveyed when they are not the subject of the abstract meaning of the discourse. Similarly, under "tone" he considers the speaker's or writer's "sense of how he stands toward those he is addressing." In either tone or feeling, abstract meaning may play an indirect part as a component in the whole context which effects the communication, but in considering tone or feeling we hold in our direct view the discourse as a whole—as affording not only words from which conventionally established abstractions may be made, but a complex

¹⁶ *Practical Criticism*, pp. 179 ff., esp. 181-82 and Appendix A, pp. 353-57. The precise meaning of intention as distinct from feeling and tone is not so very clear; one's intention may not be communicated, and if it is, it seems to coincide with feeling or, more probably, tone. See Ransom's discussion, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-65.

¹⁷ *Practical Criticism*, p. 357.

texture or "total meaning" from which, together with these conventional abstractions, other abstractions as well as various sense knowledges may be had.

Taken in themselves, feeling and tone, under one name or another, form a part of the field of almost any criticism. Richards' functions are new only in presenting themselves not as satellites of a system of abstractions projected from the mind, but as integral parts of a system of communication of which one aspect is abstract knowledge. Because he recognizes abstract meaning itself as imbedded in the matter of discourse and especially of non-scientific discourse, he provides for the understanding of poetic organization which makes the new criticism.

TOTAL MEANING AND THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTER OF POETIC ELEMENTS

In terms of total meaning imagery, dramatic situation, and meter become mechanisms of organization—not ornaments, but a part of the complexity out of which the knowledge of a poem grows and in which its simple sense exists. The new criticism rightly regards these things as functional, refusing, for example, to consider seriously meter as a mathematical abstraction because when it is so considered, its value as a unifying agent is unpredictable apart from an individual context.¹⁸

Metaphor, understood in the sense of the early rhetoricians as the transfer (*ῥητορικὴ μεταφορὰ*, *translatio*) of a word from one meaning to another, holds a preeminent place in the new criticism because of its importance as a kind of concentration point at which abstract meaning and sensory apprehension receive a plenary organization. In metaphor, one word is to do the duty of two: at first one abstraction is made, and then, this one being referred again to the context, another meaning is drawn forth. In the process of the second abstraction, all sorts of gymnastics may be resorted to: the transference of meaning is to be made from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or on the basis of any analogy,¹⁹ and we must cast about to see which of these things must be done. Discussing metaphor with reference to Shakespeare's Sonnet LXXIII, which begins

That time of year thou may'st in me behold
When yellow leaves, or none, or few do hang
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,
Bare ruin'd choirs, where late the sweet birds sang,

Empson does some casting about, enumerating some of the ways in which the boughs may be choirs (I paraphrase):

Ruined monastery choirs:

are places in which to sing;
involve sitting in a row;

¹⁸ There are countless references to these items, and a few may be listed here besides those already mentioned: Richards, *Coleridge on Imagination* (for imagery); for dramatic situation see Ransom, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-63; for meter, Richards, *Practical Criticism*, esp. pp. 225-34, and "Gerard Hopkins," *Dial*, LXXXXI (1926), 195-203: "When will prosodists seriously ask themselves what it is that they are investigating?" (p. 203).

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Poetics* 21, 1457b.

are made of wood, carved into knots, etc.;
 used to be surrounded by a sheltering building, whose clustering columns and vaulted arches suggest forest trees;
 are now abandoned by all but the grey walls colored like the skies of winter,
 etc.²⁰

These are some possibilities for connections, although how far they must be rationalized is going to vary. As Mr. Ransom remarks, the poem here manages "to come off faster" than rummaging through these meanings would allow. And yet we can hardly say that these meanings are not present in the whole. It is evident that in accepting a metaphor such as this, we deal through the imagination with meaning in the concrete, with total meaning in which these abstract meanings are contained. Metaphorical meaning is more tied to the material than meanings which are conventionally determined; it is fixed by a close dependence upon context, for if it becomes permanently attached to a word, we no longer have metaphor. Thus the metaphor lays stress upon the relation of the sensory and the intellectual. This explains its poetic importance as well as Richards' insistence on the interaction of "tenor" (new meaning) and "vehicle" (the meaning on which the new meaning is conveyed) as being the thing desired by the poet rather than the simple conveyance of the tenor itself.²¹

The question of ambiguity and its relation to the new criticism arises here with metaphor, and again, it seems to me, the key to the understanding of the relation is the new criticism's emphasis on total meaning. Ambiguity is on a par with metaphor in the critical literature. Empson has written on seven types of ambiguity in a book by that title which curiously dramatizes his subject by having no table of contents, no chapter headings, no running heads, and no index. Mr. Empson apparently had something to say, went through with it, and stopped. But what he said has been important, and it comes from a consideration of total meaning, where one finds the submergence in matter which alone makes ambiguity possible.

People are accustomed to judge automatically the forces that hold together a variety of ideas; they feel they know about the forces, if they have analyzed the ideas; many forces, indeed, are covertly included within ideas; and so of the two elements, each of which defines the other, it is much easier to find words for the ideas than for the forces. . . . I wish only, then, to say here that such vaguely imagined "forces" are essential to the totality of a poem, and that they cannot be discussed in terms of ambiguity, because they are complementary to it. But by discussing ambiguity, a great deal may be made clear about them.²²

The forces are indeed complementary to ambiguity, for they are unifying forces, and ambiguity itself is not. But ambiguity, an evil in strict logical discourse, may serve a purpose in a poem, where unified variously and accidentally, two concepts may serve better if communicated by one word. Such communication wrecks the machinery of demonstrative logic, which proceeds by necessity and, being abstract,

²⁰ William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1930), p. 3; see also Ransom, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-31.

²¹ See Ransom, *op. cit.*, pp. 65 ff., and the references to Richards there, and see especially Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, pp. 116 ff.

²² Empson, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

must hold its judgments as all judgments are held by man, one at a time; but the same kind of communication may render real service within the economy of poetry. Here, too, we can hold abstract judgments only singly, but because we regard matter so closely, other judgments are never far away and we are often moving from one to another with great rapidity. We are close to the potency, the multiplicity of matter: our judgments are ready to give way to one another quite readily. Now the choirs (boughs) are places where singing goes on, now they are things once sheltered by churches (trees). Or, more likely, we are satisfied with a more or less sensory knowledge of the resemblance from which any one of many meanings or all successively may be drawn. Thus the interest in metaphor and ambiguity, as well as in imagery, which is so closely concerned in all movements from matter, is once again interest in total meaning: meaning as related to specific material contexts.

This interest in total meaning finds expression in statements such as Mr. MacLeish's

A poem should not mean
But be,²³

which are endlessly multiplied and amplified in writings influenced by the new criticism. Such statements show an awareness in some form or other of the connections of the poem with matter—these sounds, these resemblances—which are so essential that to abstract is to destroy. Thus Empson says, "You must rely on each particular poem to show you the way in which it is trying to be good; if it fails you cannot know its object."²⁴

THE "NEW CRITICISM" AND "METAPHYSICAL" POETRY

At this point the connection becomes apparent between the new criticism, Eliot's critical theories, and the interest in "metaphysical" poetry which has grown up with the new criticism and found in Eliot its most expressive champion. The poetry of wit, called "metaphysical" perhaps not so ineptly as we are sometimes led to believe, is poetry which Eliot says "involves, probably, a recognition, implicit in the expression of every experience, of other kinds of experience which are possible."²⁵ This is the poetry of many-sided meanings, the poetry which manipulates language so as to utilize to the greatest possible extent the total meaning of words. It gives full play to the connections between our concepts deriving from the material of words so that its interest in words is not mere virtuosity but something sincere and rather scientific. The metaphysical conceit, a comparison instituted between disparities, is a comparison which resists strict logical organization. It is given its organization within the total meaning of the poem. That is to say, metaphysical poetry in cultivating strange conceits is boasting its non-logical nature and making all the more demands on "texture" for its unity, for outside the poem the far-fetched comparisons are awkward and meaningless.

²³ Archibald MacLeish, "Ars Poetica," *The Oxford Anthology of American Literature*, ed. by William Rose Benét and Norman Holmes Pearson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 1501.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

²⁵ "Andrew Marvell," *Selected Essays* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932), p. 262.

In general, the poetry which the new criticism advocates, that in the "main line" of the English tradition—with varying emphases authors such as Shakespeare, Donne, Crashaw, the two Herberts, Vaughan, Marvell, King, Pope, Hopkins, Eliot may be enumerated—is poetry which exhibits a strong texture or non-abstractive organization and thus resists the simpler forms of abstract analysis. How this is true in detail there is no room here to show, and we must leave the demonstration of the point to the reading of the poetry and of the more relevant criticism. Those who have read will know. The dethronement of Milton and his "architectural" style is a part of the converse of the picture and occurs together with a rejection of academic classicism in favor of Jonson's classicism that manifests itself in his "rooted and racy Englishness."²⁶ For Jonson's devotion to the Latins and Greeks is found in his poetry embedded in the economy of the English language. The more academic classicism, faced with our incapacity at our present two thousand year distance to reconstruct tone and even feeling in the classics except very imperfectly even with the most exhaustive scholarship, turns to some extent to the reading of classical language poems for their abstract conceptual content and for such things as meter considered pretty much in the abstract, with the result that coarseness of poetic organization or faulty total meaning comes after a while to be no longer recognized. When Milton, for instance, writes "L'Allegro," he makes a thing almost indistinguishable, as seventeenth-century lyrics go, from "Il Penseroso." The abstract denotations of the words in the two pieces differ, but the emotions and the total meaning which are further imbedded in the material of the poem and outweigh the denotations a hundred times, are almost the same in the one poem as in the other. "L'Allegro" is far off the mark hit by Shakespeare in "*As You Like It*":

It was a lover and his lass
 With a hey, and a ho, and a hey nonino,
 That o'er the green corn-field did pass,
 In the spring time, the only pretty ring time.

The simultaneous rejection by the new criticism of Milton's classicism and many of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century romantics occurs for the same generic reason—the poetry's lack of respect for the interaction of material and abstract meaning. In Leavis' discerning examination of Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind," the critic objects to the introduction of imagery which leads to abstractions that, within the poem, are disrupting rather than unifying forces. Contrary to Milton, the romantics exhibit not so much a lack of organization on a sensory level as a sensory organization incapable of unifying poetically the intellectual activity to which the sensory content of the poem gives rise.²⁷

Within this whole economy of interests Eliot's critical writing largely falls. Eliot has been interested in the metaphysicals, has, in fact, chiefly rescued them from oblivion. By a "sharpshooting" to

²⁶ F. R. Leavis, *Revaluation* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1936), p. 17.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 204-208 ff.

which some have objected, perhaps because sharpshooters waste little of their powder, he has managed to pick off some of the followers of the Miltonic camp. In his own poetry the means of organization are those we find the new criticism interested in: imagery, bulking so large in his study of Dante; dramatic situation, found at the base of almost all his poems; metaphor and calculated ambiguity stretched to the apogee of its orbit; a classicism set deep within the economy of the English language. His earliest important contribution to criticism, the "Tradition and the Individual Talent" of twenty-five years ago, foreshadows in its way the doctrines of total meaning. Eliot sets each work of art in a context with all the rest, making them interact and yield meaning in a manner curiously like that of words. "No poet," he says, "no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone." And the poet

is not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in what is not merely the present, but the present moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is dead, but of what is already living.²⁸

The poet must know what remains meaningful and what does not: his material is again not "ideas" but the already organized composite left by those who have preceded him. Within this material his poem finds its existence.

CONCLUSION

This is not meant to be a justification of everything that has been said in the name of the new criticism. The early manifestations of the movement were often brash, attended with the bluster of the self-constituted reformer rather than the humility of the investigator. Moreover, in concentrating on the organization which regards as integral the material connections of meaning, both Richards and Eliot have been led at times to state that "absence of intellectual belief need not cripple emotional belief."²⁹ This is true up to a point, our knowledge of absolutes is so deviously attained and our direct knowledge so concerned with contingencies. We may forget for the moment the connections of the former and imagine that which the latter represents to be other than it is. Furthermore, it is not the abstract thought of the poem, as we have seen, which furnishes the typically poetic organization. But the complete divorce from fact which we might like a theoretical poetry to have is in fine never achieved, and we find that Eliot comes, in the last analysis, to say that it is not.³⁰

The extremity of the position taken here by Richards and, with reservations, by Eliot comes undoubtedly from their awareness that it is not alone the abstract thought of the poem which furnishes the typically poetic organization. Competent readers will have a generous abhorrence for the pedestrian intellect which correlates a poem too closely with abstract utterance. This explains the insistence of the new criticism on the importance of the achievements of Gerard Manley Hopkins, "one of the most remarkable technical inventors who ever wrote,"³¹ and of the later linguistic methods of James Joyce, whom

²⁸ "Tradition and the Individual Talent," *op. cit.*, pp. 4 and 11.

²⁹ Richards, *Practical Criticism*, p. 278. See Eliot's essay "Dante," *op. cit.*, pp. 218-20 and 229-31 n., and "Shakespeare," *ibid.*, pp. 114-115 and 118.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

³¹ F. R. Leavis, *New Bearings in English Poetry* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1938), p. 159.

Eliot is reported to have called "the greatest master of the English language since Milton,"⁸² as well as their careful differentiation of contemporary poems which to the cursory reader seem equally "unintelligible." Joyce's writing and Hopkins', too, represent a perversion of language on the strictly logical level but a perfection capable of rare beauty on the level of poetic organization, where the discriminations are made between poems equally undigestible to the over-logical mind.

At times the new criticism has been charged with flirting with the notion of poetry as a means of salvation. Poetry it certainly recognizes as an important manifestation of human intelligence and an invaluable acquisition of human understanding. "It is the privilege of poetry," Richards says, "to preserve us from mistaking our notions either for things or for ourselves. Poetry is the completest mode of utterance."⁸³ This kind of dignity can be admitted for poetry, where our knowledge is given its most satisfactory concretion; for abstract knowledge, in one way the most perfect of human knowledges, is in another way a very imperfect kind of knowing, whereas poetic knowledge, less clear because closer to matter, is also by that same token after a fashion more real. The practical if not theoretical recognition of this fact has gone far to establish much current criticism on solid ground. And if an awareness of the importance of poetry can carry Ezra Pound to aestheticism, Mr. Pound has Leavis to bring him back to earth.

Many aspects of the new criticism have been deliberately put aside to give unity to the present essay, which has attempted to show how a movement which deliberately considers the values of ambiguity and other manifestations hostile to clear intelligibility can come to any good. The answer proposed is that in so doing the new criticism sets itself the task of investigating truly poetic procedures. If it has been empirical at times, we must remember that poetry's concern with the material side of being justifies some laboratory procedures, and we should recall that service has been done in equipping the critic with pieces of vocabulary which help to elucidate a poem rather than to produce emotional effects in his readers. Those who are familiar with criticism which seeks this latter effect should welcome the new.

The new criticism deserves considerable attention and respect in philosophical circles, and perhaps in view of its origins it needs defense. It is a child of its age in rebelling against the world of Descartes and to a lesser extent against the world of Kant. But often enough this rebellion has the virtue of being philosophically self-conscious. Richards, for example, is deliberately attacking at the same time the doctrine of progress and the mind to which Cartesianism makes its appeal when he says that "The archproblem of truth is never solved once for all; though the more we know about it, the better our local decisions should be."⁸⁴ Moreover, the leaders of the new criticism have not only moved toward positions where real

⁸² F. O. Matthiessen, *The Achievement of T. S. Eliot* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 135.

⁸³ Coleridge on *Imagination*, p. 163.

⁸⁴ *How to Read a Page*, p. 241.

philosophy becomes possible; they have done service in helping to correct a literary tradition which in its assumptions perpetuated an impossible substitute for philosophy. At least we no longer cultivate a style like that recorded by Thomas Sprat in 1667 as the ideal of the Royal Society, a style "bringing all things as near the mathematical plainness as possible," nor do we avoid all but the "soft and gentle" metaphor which received Dryden's approval in *An Essay of Dramatic Poesy* because it "does not shock us as we read it." And perhaps, then, we will not be considered devotees of the ephemeral progress ourselves if we see in the study of the mingling of the material with the abstract in poetry a way which some will follow to rescue human knowledge from the waste land of the Cartesian dichotomy and the Kantian aesthetic.

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A FORGOTTEN SENSE, THE COGITATIVE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

(Continued from March Issue)

IN OUR study of the cogitative sense we have so far viewed it alongside the estimative sense of animals and considered, in a general way, its rôle in intellection and in the cognition of the singular. We have now to examine in particular the function of the cogitative in intellectual cognition. The first aspect of this function deals with the preparation of the universal concept in the ideogenic doctrine of classical Thomism.

St. Thomas' views on this subject are found in a context in which he is stating his case against Averroes.¹ We know that Averroes considers the possible intellect as something outside of the individual and one for the entire human race. We know too that in the doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisia and of Avicenna it is the agent intellect that is posited outside the individual.

AVERROES AND THOMAS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COGITATIVE

Since Averroes places the possible intellect outside of man he cannot make this intellect the formal constitutive element in man and that which distinguishes him from the brute. What then will this distinguishing element be? It will be the passive intellect, which Aristotle, in the second book of *De Anima*² speaks of as corruptible and indispensable for the act of understanding.

What is the character of this passive intellect? For Averroes it is the cogitative. The cogitative, then, is man's formal constitutive element and specific difference. This is how Averroes looks upon the part played by the cogitative in human cognition:

(1) It grasps the differences existing between particular data and compares one with the other. Its function here is analogous to what the intellect, a completely immaterial faculty, performs with the universal.

(2) Working together with the imagination and memory the cogitative so prepares the phantasms that they will be capable of receiving from the agent intellect the influence which will make them become intelligible in act. Here the cogitative has somewhat the same relation to the intellect as the sculptor's helper has to the artist in preparing for the latter the material which he will transform into his masterpiece.

(3) In view of this same fact it is clear how the more or less perfect dispositions of the cogitative will have an effect on the intellectual power of individuals and will explain their great differences in intellectual keenness.

¹ Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.*, II, 60, 73, 75 et 76 passim. Each of these chapters should be read carefully.

² Cf. Aristotle *De Anima*, c. 5, 430a24-25. This is the translation given in the *antiqua versio* which St. Thomas used: "separatus autem (intellectus) est solum hoc quod vere est. Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est. Non reminiscitur autem quia hoc quidem impassibile est. Passivus autem intellectus est corruptibilis et sine hoc nihil intelligit anima." St. Thomas comments on this passage: *In II De Anima*, lect. 10 #743-745.

(4) Furthermore the *habitus* of science (knowledge), which is the ease with which we can draw conclusions from their principles, is acquired through frequent exercise of the cogitative. Reciprocally, the cogitative itself is perfected by the *habitus* of the various sciences.

(5) Lastly, the new-born child, even before he can perform his very first act of intellection, is, from the very first moment of his existence, endowed with this cogitative, which is that precisely by which he is a human being.

This is, then, at least as St. Thomas sees it, the part which Averroes assigns to the cogitative.³ As a matter of fact, the exact view of the Arab philosopher concerns us but little. What we are looking for is the Angelic Doctor's own view in the matter.

First of all, he grants Averroes that the passive intellect, corruptible and altogether necessary for the act of intellection, is indeed a sense. In his own commentary on *De Anima* he limits himself to this general statement.⁴ In his explanation of the *Ethics*, however, he states definitely that this sense is the cogitative: "The cogitative is a sense called the intellect of the sensible and singular. It is this sense which Aristotle, in the third book of the treatise on the Soul, calls the passive intellect and of which he says that it is corruptible."⁵

After he has conceded this point St. Thomas absolutely refuses to admit that the cogitative is the constitutive element of the human species or that it is the subject of the *habitus* of the various sciences. He also denies that the new-born child, before his first act of intellection, is deprived of possible intellect and must get along with only the passive intellect or cogitative. His reason for this stand, which he insists upon in any number of forms, is always this: the cogitative is a sense; hence it cannot rise to the spiritual level, a thing which it would have to do in order to fulfil the functions ascribed to it by Averroes.⁶

For the rest St. Thomas accepts Averroes' views. We have already seen from Thomas' own writings the doctrine that the cogitative distinguishes and compares particular data in the same way that the intellect does universal data. However, the function of preparing phantasms before the agent intellect begins its work calls for closer examination.

³ Cf. the entire first paragraph of *Sum. c. Gent.*, II. 60, too long to be quoted here and easily available to all. Less available is the Averroes text. The Leonine edition of the *Summa contra Gentiles* (vol. XIII, p. 419) gives this reference to Averroes: *In III De Anima*, text 20, ad cap. V, 2. I had at hand an edition of 1521, printed at Pavia *cura ac diligentia soleritis viri Jacob Paucidrapii de Burgo franco*. In this edition we read the following: "... et sunt tres virtutes in homine quarum esse declaratum est in Sensu et Sensata, scilicet et imaginativa et cogitativa et rememorativa istae enim tres virtutes sunt in homine ad praesentendam formam rei imaginatae quando sensus fuerit absens et ideo dictum fuit illic quod cum istae tres virtutes adjuverint se ad invicem forte representabunt individuum rei secundum quod est in suo esse. ... Et indendebat hoc per intellectum possibilem formas imaginationis secundum quod in eas agit virtus cogitativa propria hominis. Ista enim virtus est aliqua ratio et actio ejus nihil est quam ponere intentiones formae imaginationis cum suo individuo apud rememorationem aut distinguere eas ab eo apud formationem. Et manifestum est quod intellectus qui dicitur materialis recipit intentiones imaginatas post hanc distinctionem. Iste igitur intellectus possibilis necessarius est in formatione."

⁴ Cf. *loc. supra cit.*, §745

⁵ Cf. *In VI Ethicorum*, lect. 9 §1249.

⁶ Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.*, II. 60 n. 2., and cf. also the example in 73 n. 16, 17 and 18.

RÔLE OF THE COGITATIVE IN FORMING THE UNIVERSAL

Far from rejecting this function, St. Thomas makes it his own in so many words. In the seventy-third chapter of this same second book of the *Contra Gentes* the Angelic Doctor looks into the unicity of the possible intellect which Averroes held. If, he says, the possible intellect is one for all men, and consequently outside of each of them, whence will men get the specific principle which will distinguish them from mere animals? This cannot come from man's sensitive soul, nor from phantasms, nor from the cogitative. And why not from this last? Because there is only one relation between it and the possible intellect, namely, the work of preparation done by the cogitative on the phantasms to enable them, under the influence of the agent intellect, to become intelligible in act and capable of actuating the possible intellect. Now this action of the cogitative is but intermittent, whereas our specification as human beings must necessarily be unchangeable and constant. Thus, neither the cogitative nor its action can possibly be the sought-for specifying element in man. Obviously the major premise of this Thomistic argument, which St. Thomas evidently admits, is taken from Averroes.

Nor would it be true to call this a mere argument *ad hominem*. Nothing in the text would justify such a view. Besides we have evidence from other texts that St. Thomas really made this doctrine his own.

In the seventy-third chapter St. Thomas examines the view of Alexander of Aphrodisia and that of Avicenna, who for his part made the agent intellect a separated substance. St. Thomas' objection is that, were the agent intellect a separated substance, we would be unable to posit our acts of intellection *as we please*. There would be two and only two alternatives: to be forever in act, or to lack the free exercise of our intellect. Both alternatives are equally false. But Avicenna replies that though the agent intellect is surely required to enable us to place our act of intellection, it alone is not sufficient. On our part the phantasm must be ready to receive its action. Now the proper preparation of the phantasm is brought about by the cogitative, and the cogitative is subject to our control.

Very well, replies Thomas, but in what does this preparation performed by the cogitative for the act of intellection consist? Avicenna replies that it consists in putting the possible intellect in a condition to receive the intelligible forms abstracted from the phantasms by the agent intellect. Averroes and Alexander of Aphrodisia object strongly and declare that the preparation consists rather in making the phantasms themselves capable of becoming intelligible. The first theory is of no interest to us here. Thomas gives his answer to the second in these words: "Quod per cogitativam disponantur phantasmata ad hoc quod fiant intelligibilia actu et moventia intellectum possibilem conveniens non videtur si intellectus agens ponatur substantia separata."⁷ True. But if, with St. Thomas and the majority of scholastic

⁷ Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.*, II. 76 n. 11. And also in 73 n. 18 where St. Thomas had already written: "Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem quo intelligit homo nisi per suum actum quo praeeparantur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentem fiant intelligibilia in actu et perficientia intellectum possibilem."

philosophers the agent intellect is considered to be a faculty of each individual human soul, then—the Angelic Doctor's opinion is clear—the obstacle exists no longer, and such an influence on the part of the cogitative can be admitted without any difficulty.

Comes then the inevitable question: how are we to conceive this influence? The solution is also in the *Contra Gentes*, in the answer made to the Averroist doctrine on the cogitative as subject of the science-habitus.⁸ St. Thomas first refutes the error directly, then seeks the reason for the error. According to him, Averroes must have observed a certain connection in us between the degree of facility with which we acquire learning and the more or less favorable condition of the cogitative and the imagination. The next step was to conclude to the direct perfecting of these sensible faculties by the *habitus* of science, a step which the Arab philosopher at once took.

St. Thomas says that this conclusion is an invalid one. A *habitus* can perfect only the faculty which acts, and, in the case of knowledge, the operation made easier by the *habitus* is a spiritual one, which by its very nature goes beyond the capacity of the cogitative, an organic and consequently material faculty. Hence it is impossible to conceive the cogitative as the subject of the *habitus* of science. Does this mean that facility for intellectual work in no wise depends on the imagination and the cogitative? St. Thomas is careful not to reject every such influence. He insists, though, that such influence can be only indirect and remote, somewhat like that of which Aristotle speaks in the famous text of the *De Anima*.⁹ "Duri enim carne inepti mente; molles autem carne, bene apti", which the Angelic Doctor comments on as follows: "Ad bonam autem complexionem corporis sequitur nobilitas animae; quia omnis forma est proportionata suae materiae. Unde sequitur quod qui sunt boni tactus sunt nobiliores animae et perspicaciores mentis."

Nor is this all. This indirect influence is not exercised on the possible intellect itself, but on the object to be known, or more exactly on the phantasm which represents this object. In proportion as the cogitative and the imagination are perfect, the phantasm will be more perfectly prepared to play its part in the elaboration of what is called in technical language the *species intelligibiles impressae*. This part consists in this, that under the influence of the agent intellect the phantasms, previously intelligible in potency, become intelligible in act.

St. Thomas has left it to his disciples to develop the details of this last explanation. This is how the great commentator of the *Contra Gentes*, Sylvester de Sylvestris develops it.

The Thomistic formula to the effect that the cogitative and the imagination prepare the phantasm to become more easily intelligible in act can be taken in two ways. In the first place, once the phantasm is received in the imagination, the imagination, aided by the cogitative, would act upon it and would dispose it to receive an influx from the agent intellect by reason of which the phantasm, intelligible in potency, would be put in the act of intelligibility. In the second interpretation, the phantasm is so much the more apt to become intelligible

⁸ Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.*, II. 73 nn. 27, 28 and 29.

⁹ Cf. Aristotle *De Anima*, II, 9, 421a25; *In II De Anima*, lect. 19 #485.

in act, as the organ of the cogitative or imaginative in which it is received is itself more perfectly disposed.

Ferrariensis declares that the first element of the commentary is to be rejected altogether. How indeed is it possible to conceive that the phantasm, a material entity, constituted by and in an organic faculty, should be transformed, as it were, into something spiritual? The second interpretation is therefore the one to be taken. To understand its scope let us call to mind how intelligible species are formed in the Thomistic philosophy. Their efficient cause is the agent intellect, which, however, employs the phantasm as instrumental cause. Before the phantasm is united to the agent intellect as the instrument is united to the one who makes use of it, the phantasm is said to be intelligible in potency; after it has acted as an instrument under the action of the agent intellect, it is said to be intelligible in act. Both before and after it remains what it is, namely, something corporeal and organic. No matter what the theory, it does not—it cannot—become something spiritual.¹⁰

Since the phantasm is acting as instrument in the production of intelligible species, it is easy to see that if the phantasm is more perfect, its instrumental action will also be more perfect; and the total effect produced by the principal cause and the instrumental cause, namely, the intelligible species, will also be more perfect; and the possible intellect, actuated by these more perfect species, will finally place the act of intellection properly so called with a greater degree of perfection. In the same way an expert, given a better tool, can do his work more easily, more quickly, and with better results.

But how can we conceive this perfecting of the cogitative, first in its organ, and as a result in its operation? Besides its speculative interest, the question also has some practical importance. Indeed, it is quite clear that the answer might affect in general the methodology of any intellectual work, and individual pedagogical methods in particular. After all, as St. Thomas grants to Averroes, we are in full control of our cogitative. Hence, if we know how to dispose this faculty to the best advantage, we will have at hand the means to improve our intellectual power of understanding, and our ideas will therefore be more clear and precise.

I do not know that St. Thomas or his commentators ever raised this question. Medieval thought never took this rather experimental direction. Still, could there perhaps be some hint of it in the words of Ferrariensis just referred to? "*Quanto recipitur in organo imaginationis et cogitativae perfectius disposito, tanto magis aptum est ad hoc ut fiat actu intelligibile.*" It would thus be a question of general physical health, and, more in particular, of integrity of the brain-substance and normal condition of the nervous system. There would thus be a place in the Thomistic system for the suggestions of experts in hygiene who recommend that the body be comfortable in order to do its best work, and for the claims of experimental psy-

¹⁰ Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.*, II. 73, *supra cit.* This commentary will be found in the Leonine edition of the *Summa contra Gentiles* (vol. 13, p. 466, xi, n. 2 and 3). I give here the thought of Ferrariensis, but to understand it fully we must remember both the theory of the instrumental cause and the explanation given by Thomists to make clear the collaboration of Phantasms with the action of the agent intellect. To explain all this did not enter into the scope of my present subject.

chology on the development and training of the imagination and memory.

This then is Thomistic thought on the part played by the cogitative in forming the universal concept. Certain further details must be emphasized in order to grasp its full scope.

COLLABORATION OF INTERIOR SENSE FACULTIES

First of all, this intervention of the cogitative is not limited exclusively to those concepts which imply an element of harmfulness or of usefulness; it is found in the elaboration of any concept taken from concrete and individual reality, precisely because the datum of the individual, inasmuch as it is individual, is a *species insensata*.

Since in this intervention the cogitative works together with the memory and the imagination, the phantasm from which the intelligible species are abstracted is not the product of the imagination alone, as many a current textbook would lead us to think. It is the result of the combined operation of each of these internal senses. It may even possibly be said that in this common operation one sense or another will play a greater or lesser part depending on the nature of the object to be known and its relation to the knowing subject. We must admit this if we keep in mind the fact that there is in us but one real principle of action, the human person, essentially one, which, in order to perform its specific operation *par excellence*, intellection, brings into play this wonderful combination of different faculties which, each in its own way and according to its proper place in the ensemble, makes its contribution toward realizing that masterpiece which is the human idea.

But the human idea is abstract and universal. Now we must act according to the data of reason, whereas our actions themselves are concrete and singular. We must therefore in one way or another come to a knowledge of the material singular thing, the more so since no one can deny the fact that we do have this intellectual knowledge. Hence it is that every scholastic philosophy has some answer to give to the complex problem presented by this type of knowledge.

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION OF THE SINGULAR

St. Thomas makes this knowledge indirect and reflex. After the preparation we have spoken of, the possible intellect, actuated by the intelligible species taken from the phantasm by the operation of the agent intellect, places its specific act which consists in "saying" the mental word, or, if one prefers to put it so, in conceiving the idea. Thereupon, and immediately, the intelligence turns itself back, as it were, on its own act, and takes it as the object for a new act. It is then that the single knowing subject which is the human person observes that the abstract idea, conceived by the possible intellect, has its principle in the phantasm of which it is the continuation, and, in this phantasm, observes a similar continuation with the actual or past operation of the external senses. In this way the knowing subject, by putting the combination of its faculties into operation, reaches the concrete and the singular.

The phantasm then, next to the intelligence, is the principal element in this complex operation of knowing the material singular thing intellectually. We have seen how the cogitative holds a place of

prime importance in preparing the phantasm, and, consequently, in preparing the universal concept. This same place must be accorded it in the knowledge of the singular, and for the same reasons. Does not St. Thomas look upon the cogitative as the faculty of the individual precisely as individual? Ferrariensis is therefore right when he says in his commentary on the *Contra Gentes*:

The soul united to the body . . . cannot know the singular thing directly. It has an intellectual knowledge of the singular which is simply reflex, in this sense that it turns back on its operation, on the principle of this operation, and on the phantasm, the cause of the intelligible species. Such a turning back (*quae reflexio*) could never be realized without the help of the cogitative and the imagination, both of them sensible powers.¹¹

Thus, on the one hand, the cogitative is active in the process of going up from the concrete to the abstract, and, on the other hand, it plays a part in going down from the abstract to the concrete. I do not think that this constitutes a departure from the thought of the Angelic Doctor when he makes what is harmful or useful the formal object of the cogitative. Indeed, we have explicit texts in which the individual is shown as belonging to the cogitative. Furthermore, let us note this fact. Every action is concrete. In fact, we go to the concrete, we seek to know the singular material thing for no other reason than to act. Theory and speculation remain in the field of the abstract, and it is in that field that we find science and speculative truth. We can therefore say that the concrete thing invites us to act; knowledge of the individual thing is a practical knowledge. Now, action goes of necessity toward the good it wishes to possess and shrinks from the evil it wishes to avoid, and it makes no difference whether the good itself be seeming or real. This is but a form of the first principle of finality which we will not fail to recognize if we remember that the notions of end and good are interchangeable. Thus, when the cogitative prepares in us the knowledge of the singular material thing, it does nothing other than act according to its nature as a faculty which judges some object to be good or bad, useful or harmful to the one who acts; and so we arrive again at the general idea of Thomistic teaching on this point.

THE COGITATIVE AND THE *Experimentum*

The cogitative helps to form the concept by preparing the phantasm; it has something to do with the knowledge of the singular thing. It also has a part to play in establishing those more complete and more rich concepts which are formed gradually and which particularly in combination make up practical science. We must now look into this function of the cogitative.

St. Thomas gives us his views on the subject in his commentary on the first chapter of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. In studying the notion of wisdom under which all forms of knowledge are grouped in proper order the Angelic Doctor notes the presence in man of memory, and somewhat like memory but of greater perfection, what he calls *experimentum* and Aristotle calls ἐμπειρία. What does he mean by this? His answer is put in these terms:

Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria

¹¹ Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.*, II. 74 (Leon. ed., vol. XIII, p. 472).

réceptorum. Hujus autem collatio est homini propria et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur, quae est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium. Sicut autem se habet experimentum ad rationem particularem, et consuetudo ad memoriam, ita se habet ars ad rationem.¹²

The *experimentum* is therefore the result of a *collatio* of particular data, in the sense in which this word has been explained above. This is why St. Thomas attributes it to the cogitative as to the faculty which places it; as if in his opinion this operation of gathering together concrete data is the very type of the operation of the cogitative, even though the element of useful or harmful be absent. Thus, the *experimentum* is something proper to man, just as is the cogitative itself. In animals there is to be found at best something which approximates the *experimentum*, which would be that kind of progress in the instinct of animals which moderns have made a great deal of and which is too often considered as unchangeable. St. Thomas observes that as a matter of fact, thanks to the multiplicity of sensations and thanks to the memory of these sensations which the animal keeps, certain associations are established which teach the animal to seek certain objects and avoid others. Observers tell us that this explains why, in the eighteenth century, whales in the southern seas did not flee from ships, whereas those in northern waters did; the first named as yet were not aware of the danger which threatened their species from these great sailing machines.

Man therefore has the *experimentum* as a privilege. Why? For our answer let us analyze the example used by St. Thomas.¹³ Plato has been sick; his pulse was rapid, his temperature too high, his tongue coated—these are so many external sensations which I have made and noted in my memory. Some doctor, as I have seen for myself or been told, gave him a dose of a certain herb—more external sensations which I have similarly noted. Now the sick man's pulse is back to normal, his temperature is lower, his tongue is cleared, and he is cured—a third series of external sensations also noted in memory. Thereupon I said that Plato was cured of his fever by this medicine. I have made the same observations in the case of Socrates, Phaedo, Critias, and so forth.

Now let it be noted that each of these sensations, external as it is and therefore concrete and singular, was accompanied by universal and abstract ideas. I had the general ideas of man, pulse, rapidity, fever, and so forth, and in forming these ideas the cogitative had its part, as we mentioned above. I also had an indirect intellectual knowledge of each of these singular objects, of this man called Plato or Socrates, of this coated tongue. Once again the cogitative has been at work. These interventions of the cogitative come before that of which we now have to speak.

These various observations concerning Plato, Socrates, Phaedo, Critias, were successively recorded in my memory, perhaps at widely different times. But now, I place them all together in my actual, present consciousness; I remember them. Then, going from one to the other, I note the concrete similarity of concrete symptoms in the case of each of my sick men; I note that the four doses of medicine which cured them show a similarity of concrete characteristics; I see

¹² Cf *In I Meta.*, lect. 1 #15 (Pirotta ed.).

¹³ *Ibid.*, #19.

that the concrete effect in the four cases was the same. I have therefore a concrete knowledge of these singular instances under a common nature. Now this last named knowledge is what St. Thomas calls *experimentum*. He sees it as a *collatio*, that is to say, a gathering together, a collection of singular data going to make up a singular whole.

In this knowledge the first thing I have is a series of what St. Thomas calls judgments of the senses; that is to say, an operation which attributes some characteristic taken in its singularity to a being itself considered as singular. Plato's pulse has this certain quickening, or again, Plato no longer has this particular pulse-beat. We do not go beyond the singular in this operation, and I see no reason why we may not speak of judgment in the case. Needless to say, this will not be a judgment in the formal meaning of the word, since this formal meaning implies a complete reflexion of the faculty on itself, involving intellect; but it will nevertheless be a judgment which can be referred to as inchoate (*judicium inchoative dictum*).

But I have more than all this. There is a passing from a singular instance to another singular instance, whose result is a concrete observation of an equally concrete similarity. What is to prevent the use of the words *inquirere* or *discurrere* to designate the operation which enabled me to achieve this result? In their strictly etymological sense they are really verified here, since in this process there is really a seeking (*inquirere*), and in this seeking there is really a passing from one thing to another, a progress from here to there (*discurrere*). Why should these two words necessarily and without any exception be given an exclusively spiritual meaning? That may be very well for ordinary language, in which they are set aside to designate the operation of the spiritual reason. Nevertheless, when these words are used to designate a faculty to whose organic and material character attention is called at every moment, any honest exegete must admit that St. Thomas, in order to bring out the analogy existing between the cogitative and reason, has here used the words in their etymological meaning, indifferent to the element of materiality or immateriality.

If this is a faithful analysis—and I do believe it is—it seems to me that the Suarezian difficulty referred to above, which points out the radical impossibility for the cogitative to judge and draw conclusions, falls of its own weight.

It also seems to me that according to St. Thomas this function of the cogitative makes it the faculty which would prepare an induction by gathering together the more or less numerous instances from which the intellect induces a universal law. The cogitative then would direct the process which today is called observation of facts or experimentation, whether we take this in the strictly scientific sense of the words or in a broader sense.

THE *Experimentum* AS "EXPERIENCE"

If all this is true the latin word *experimentum*, which I have not as yet translated, could well be translated "experience." This is all the more so as the accumulation of these *experimenta* will give us what we refer to as experience in such phrases as the following: a man of experience, an experienced pilot, a workman experienced in

his field, a politician with experience in parliamentary law. Since these experiences increase with the years they will go to make up the experience of the elders, transmitting itself from generation to generation and forming at length the wisdom of nations.

Do not misunderstand me. I do not mean to claim that in all this the cogitative is alone at work. Such is indeed not the case, for in man the intellect is always dominant in the operation performed. But this does not make less true the fact that in Thomas' opinion it is the cogitative which prepares for the intellect all the singular material from which the intelligence draws its ideas, and forms its own judgments and reasonings.

This experience—we may use the word now—is logically attributed to the cogitative by St. Thomas. For it makes us know singular instances, inasmuch as they are gathered together into a concrete unity by their concrete grouping. But this last datum is not a *species sensata*, for neither sight, nor hearing, nor taste can give it to us; consequently it falls under the class of *species insensatae*, which, as we saw in the beginning, is the object of the cogitative. Besides, St. Thomas calls attention to the fact that the result of this experience is to make the action more easy and more correct. If it is true that every action seeks the good and avoids the bad, we now find once more, not by some subtle roundabout process but by a deepening of our analysis, that same element of harmful and useful which, as St. Thomas constantly repeats, is what the cogitative seeks in the *species insensatae*.

Since the cogitative is the faculty of experience in the sense just explained it will be found at the very foundation of what Aristotle calls τέχνη,¹⁴ and St. Thomas calls *ars*, a word which we might translate as *art*, provided we take it in the meaning suggested when we speak of the culinary art, the art of military tactics, the art of medicine, or even the art of fishing with a line. It might be better perhaps to keep the Greek word and translate it as "technique." There is an interesting text of the Angelic Doctor in this connection.

Ponit generationem artis et dicit quod ex experientia¹⁵ in hominibus fit ars et scientia. . . . Modus autem quo ars fit ex experimento est idem cum modo quo experimentum fit ex memoria. Nam sicut ex multis fit una experimentalis scientia [note this word *scientia*, which is evidently to be taken in the general sense of knowledge and not in the restricted meaning given it by Aristotle], ita ex multis experimentis apprehensis fit universalis acceptio de omnibus similibus. Unde plus habet ars quam experimentum quia experimenta tantum circa singularia versantur; ars autem circa universalia.

So this technique is developed through an accumulation of concrete experiences from which the intelligence draws a universal idea and general rules.

Even after all this St. Thomas does not consider that the cogitative has yet played its full part. Using a comparison between experience

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Meta.*, I, c.1, 980b29-981a5.

¹⁵ Cf. *In I Meta.*, loc. supra. cit., #18. Concerning this text of St. Thomas let it be noted that the word *experientia* renders the Greek ἐμπειρία, *experimentalis scientia* corresponds to τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων, literally *ex multis conceptionibus experimentis*. The word *science* should not be made too much of.

and technique he enables us to look far into the work of this internal sense in human action.

Experience and technique are similar in this, that they are both connected with action; the purpose of both is the concrete execution of some purpose. But on this field of the singular the cogitative with its experience and the intellect with its technique are not of equal efficacy; experience, and consequently the cogitative, has the upper hand. This is easily understood. Technique, intellectual as it is, does not go beyond the universal, and so remains at a distance from action which is concrete; but experience, as the function of a singular sense, is at home in the field of the singular. In fact, we observe this in our daily experience. A nurse will often do far more good to a patient than some *cum laude* graduate of the medical school with the ink scarce dry on his diploma, who knows his theory inside and out as he finds it in books, but has had no clinical or hospital experience. This is the very example used by St. Thomas.

Cum ars sit universalium, experientia singularium, si aliquis habet rationem artis sine experientia, erit quidem perfectus in hoc quod universale cognoscat, sed quia ignorat singulare (cum experientia careat) multoties in curando peccabit, quia sanatio magis pertineat ad singulare quam ad universale, cum ad hoc pertineat per se, ad illud per accidens.¹⁶

Of course, once the young doctor has acquired experience, he knows far more than the nurse, because he has knowledge of both the universal and the concrete.

This must not lead us to extol the cogitative above the intellect. Knowledge through technique is indeed more perfect, since it enables us to know causes and to some extent essences, whereas experience affords only a surface knowledge of facts. When one has technique he is not greatly disturbed by unexpected obstacles and difficulties and is quite able to handle them, using the general ideas in his possession. Given experience alone, however, the least obstacle, the first exception to previously noted experiences can throw everything out of gear. Finally, when there is question of establishing the hierarchy of our various knowledges and connecting them all with a higher principle—which is the very work of wisdom—art, grasping as it does the various universals, can at once discover their hierarchical order. Experience, on the contrary, cannot do this, because it sees only facts following upon one another in time and space. Add the fact that technique can be taught, but experience cannot. For to teach, in the large and noble sense of the word, is to make to know, and to know is to have cognition of a thing by its causes. Experience knows nothing about causes. Technique, which grasps the universal and the suprasensible, does attain to them. Technique can therefore demonstrate, lead to knowledge, teach. We do say that the man of experience can communicate the result of his experiences. Though this is true, St. Thomas notes that the man of experience can transmit his experience only as "opinion," that is to say, as a greater or less probability, somewhat after the fashion of the statistical laws laid down by our modern scientists, while for the pupil there will be no more than an acceptance on faith of what is given, and by no means a certitude which is the product of an apodictic demonstration.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, #22.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, #29. Note in this text the use of the word opinion, to express an assent given to what is contingent and singular.

THE COGITATIVE AND SENSE APPETITION

What we have called technique deals directly with the material activity of human industry, if we take these words in as broad a sense as possible. There is, above this, a technique of human living, an art of living which is ultimately nothing other than the pursuit of happiness, man's last end. This pursuit rules our moral activity properly so called.¹⁸ The part that the cogitative plays in material activity naturally leads us to ask whether this internal faculty has a similar influence in the moral field. Since happiness, the object of moral philosophy, is only the ordered satisfaction of our appetites we will perhaps be able to discover some influence of the cogitative as well in the domain of sensible appetite as in that of rational appetite or free will.

Let us begin with the sensible appetite. Its operation depends on previous knowledge of an object which possesses sensible goodness. In some cases the external senses will be able to furnish this knowledge; their pleasure or pain will be enough to explain the desire or aversion as well as the movements of approach or flight performed by the faculty of locomotion. In other cases, however, the external senses will not suffice as an explanation. This is why we noted at the very beginning of this study that the Ancients admitted the existence of an estimative-cogitative faculty, precisely to explain the movement of flight of the ewe on meeting the wolf and on the feeling of fear which brings that movement about. We may therefore say that the knowledge proper to the cogitative is essentially directed toward action, since it is of its very nature to affect the sensible appetite. "Ab ea (cogitativa) natus est moveri appetitus sensitivus."¹⁹

Consequently, if the intellect can exercise some influence on this same appetite and on the passions which depend on it, it will necessarily do so through the cogitative. Thus Cajetan well expresses the Master's thought when he writes: "In man the appetite is put into motion and directed by the cogitative; the latter in turn is actuated by universal reason; this is why it may be said that the latter puts into motion and directs the sensible appetite."²⁰ The truth of this is clear. As we have seen, the cogitative is the faculty of the particular inasmuch as it is particular, and only the particular good can affect the sensible appetite. In the domain of action then we have a part played by the cogitative which is parallel to that which it has in the domain of knowledge: the intellect knows the singular only through the cogitative and acts upon it only through that same faculty.

By reason of its very character of *ratio particularis*, namely, of a sense which participates in the operation of reason properly so called, the cogitative in man has a lesser scope than has the estimative in the beast. Let us explain what we mean. In the case of the animal, once the estimative has knowledge of a good, the appetite is at once

¹⁸ This, after all, is the classic distinction between *factibilia*, with which what I have called technique is concerned, and *agibilia*, the work of action inasmuch as it is moral and prudent.

¹⁹ Cf. S. T., I. 81. 3.

²⁰ Cf. Cajetan's commentary on S. T., I. 81.3. It is rather interesting to note that of all the parallel passages in which St. Thomas speaks of the domination of the rational part over the sensitive this text of the *Summa* is the only one in which he introduces the cogitative.

moved and with absolute necessity puts the faculties of locomotion in motion to take possession—or at least attempt to take possession—of the good presented. The very same is true of a danger to be avoided. Once the wolf is known, fear arises in the sensible appetite of the ewe and panicky flight results. With man, however, it is different. The cogitative can judge one or another object dangerous or pleasurable without the corresponding exterior movement following necessarily. No doubt, in the majority of cases, the appetite will be excited and will feel desire or aversion regarding the object in question. It will even bring about unreasoned flight or irresistible forward movement; such are the *primo-primi*, spontaneous actions on which cold reason has not had a chance to act. But soon reason gains or regains the mastery; by its absolute controlling power over the movements of the body it will stop them or allow them to continue as it pleases. As regards the passions, however, reason will have to be content with calming them down or arousing them further by dwelling on rational and universal motives of a nature to oppose or confirm the sensible and particular motives furnished by the cogitative; in a word, by giving the cogitative its approval or disapproval.

With us then the cogitative has not absolute power of direction over our passions, as has the estimative in the case of animals, because the cogitative is not the highest light we have in which to direct our conduct. On the other hand, if intellect exercises over the inferior portion of our being that twofold domination, despotic and political, of which Aristotle spoke, and St. Thomas after him, it can exercise such power only by making use of the cogitative, very much like a prince who governs slaves and free citizens through his ministers.

With this last remark we touch upon the field of the will, and so of moral proper. We have to do with those acts by which we tend freely toward our end as human beings, purely and simply, which is happiness.

THE COGITATIVE AND INTELLECTUAL APPETITION

Now, in the moral order, no act is good unless it is placed under the action of natural or supernatural virtues. These virtues give ease to the activity of our faculties, perfect their operation, introduce joy and power into their progress toward good. It is through them that our will decides promptly to render to each his due (justice), or that the lower tendencies of our sensible nature are kept under the yoke of right reason (fortitude and temperance).

But before he acts the virtuous man must throw light on the path he is to follow. He is a just man, and he knows that detraction is to be avoided, and he makes up his mind to avoid it; he has the virtue of temperance, and he knows the commandment: "Thou shalt not commit adultery," and he wills to keep it; he is a man of fortitude, and he is quite aware of the fact that there are times when duty must be accomplished at the cost of painful sacrifices, and he is resolved to accept these sacrifices. Lines of action and resolutions of this kind are general. Action is the most concrete thing there is, shot through as it is with very exact circumstances of persons, time and place. Is this thing I have in mind to tell my neighbor here and now a real instance of detraction, or is it something he really ought to know? Is the growing friendship between Arthur and Jean such as to put

them in danger of some act of conjugal infidelity? Suppose I am a doctor, and some patient asks me to perform an operation which, as a doctor, I see is quite unnecessary, and which my conscience tells me is unlawful. If I refuse to perform the operation I shall lose this rich patient, and many others besides. Must I sacrifice my own interests, themselves quite legitimate, to scruples which many of my fellow-doctors brush aside so easily? In a word, we have the problem of harmonizing the individual instance with the general law.

The virtue of prudence is the one to give the answer. To be able to give this answer the prudent man must know the universal principles and the concrete conditions in which, if I may so speak, the principles will take flesh.²¹ Above all he must have knowledge of the concrete. We do meet people who have practically no general ideas, but who are nevertheless better than others when it comes to action. Their experience of reality is greater. This is so true that, while we insist on the necessity of general principles, we must be ready to give these up should we have to make a choice between them and the concrete,²² for prudence is active reason and the concrete is closer to action.

The prudent man must reach a practico-practical decision. In view of the circumstances of time, place and persons in which I actually find myself, I must keep the information I have to myself. This decision is the conclusion of a syllogism which St. Thomas calls the prudential syllogism. It is often only implicit, instantaneous, and scarce conscious. In more obscure cases it is the synthesis of a more or less long and complicated process of deliberation. The major of this syllogism is some universal law of justice (detraction is forbidden), or of temperance or of fortitude; the minor is some concrete and particular fact (to give the information I have to others is detraction). Prudence uses its influence in shaping this concrete and particular judgment.

But the knowledge of what is concrete, individual, contingent cannot, at least directly, belong to the intellect, the faculty of the abstract, universal, necessary. To get to this minor premise there is need of a sensible faculty, since only such a faculty can grasp the concrete, individual, contingent. This faculty cannot be an external sense, held down as it is to knowledge of a proper sensible quality, such as what is colored, sonorous, and so forth, whereas there is a question here of grasping the entire individual inasmuch as it is individual. This faculty must therefore necessarily be some internal sense, with the capacity of perceiving data outside the scope of exterior senses, and able to gather the particular data together and judge them from the viewpoint of the end of man; that is, in the light of good or evil. We have already found all these required characteristics in the cognitive. And this, indeed is St. Thomas' own conclusion in his commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics:

Quia singularia proprie cognoscuntur per sensum, oportet quod homo horum singularium quae dicimus esse principia et extrema habeat sensum non solum exteriorem, sed etiam interiorem, cujus supra dixit (Aristoteles) esse prudentiam, scilicet, vis cogitativam sive aestimativam quae dicitur ratio particularis.²³

²¹ Cf. *S. T.*, II-II 47. 3.

²² Cf. *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 6. #1194.

²³ Cf. *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 9 #1249.

It is evident that it is by reason of his views on the cogitative as the faculty of the individual, as we noted above, that St. Thomas brings it into the prudential reasoning process. In the last analysis he is only applying to the domain of moral the psychological analysis we saw him make a while back. In the formation of the phantasm from which the agent intellect draws the intelligible species necessary for the universal concept, and in keeping before consciousness this same phantasm toward which the intellect turns itself back in order to know the material singular thing, St. Thomas did not isolate the cogitative from the other internal senses. Here too, as the *Summa Theologica* puts it, it is when "perfected by the memory and by experience that the cogitative allows the prudent man to judge the concrete cases, objects of experience, with speed and ease."²⁴

We must therefore, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the *agere* what we have read concerning the *feri* in the commentary on the *Metaphysics*; experience (*experimentum*) in the sense there explained comes in here. Thus, just as for art or technique the lapse of years is of great importance, so in the order of prudence, old age has the advantage over youth, and, taking up again a text of Aristotle, Thomas writes these curious lines: "Non videtur quod juvenis fiat prudens. Cujus causa est quia prudentia est circa singularia quae fiunt nobis cognita per experientiam. Juvenis autem non potest esse expertus quia ad experientiam requiritur multitudo temporis."²⁵ Hence, the more the cogitative knows concrete cases, and becomes skilful in going over them to discover elements of resemblance, and makes those concrete judgments of which we spoke above, the more will the intellect in turn become able to embody the general laws of the virtues in the concrete and the more will it come to the conclusion according to right reason to place a certain action or not, in this way or in that; in a word, the more will the individual conform his conduct to the *recta ratio agibilium*, that is, to prudence.

THE COGITATIVE AND PRUDENCE

But then prudence appears as a perfecting and a habitus, not of the spiritual intellect, as is commonly taught, but of the cogitative! If we limit ourselves to the commentary on the *Ethics*, we do indeed get that impression. Not only does St. Thomas note without objection that Aristotle attributes prudence to a sense which Thomas himself thinks is the cogitative,²⁶ but he even writes: "Ad istum sensum (interiorem scilicet) *magis* pertinet prudentia per quam perficitur ratio particularis ad recte existimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium."²⁷ And he draws the conclusion that beasts, because of

²⁴ Cf. S. T., II-II. 47. 3 ad 3. "Prudentia non consistit in sensu exteriori . . . sed in sensu interiori, qui perficitur per memoriam et per experimentum ad prompte iudicandum de particularibus expertis."

²⁵ Cf. *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 7 #1208.

²⁶ Cf. *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 9 #1249 with its reference to the Greek text: c. 8, 1242a30. I am attempting to present St. Thomas' and not Aristotle's opinion in my text. It would seem that the medieval Doctor here differs from the real opinion of the Stagirite. This is all the more probable as in the opinion of Susemihl the Greek text here has been altered. Cf. *Arstotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. Fr. Susemihl—O. Apelt (Leipzig: Teubner), p. 135. Note line 30.

²⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, #1215.

the fact that they possess the estimative faculty, the parallel of our own cogitative, in some sort are endowed with this virtue of prudence, and he repeats this same idea not only in his commentaries on the *De Anima* and the *Metaphysics*, but also in his *De Veritate*.²⁸

But on the other hand, when he treats of the basis of prudence in the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas does not take this same stand: Prudence does not consist in an external sense . . . but in an internal sense which memory and experience perfect in such a way that it may pass quick judgment on particular cases. This does not mean that prudence finds its principal subject in an internal sense. It exists in the reason first of all; it reaches this sense only *per quamdam applicationem*.²⁹

What are we to make of this? Commenting on this article of the *Summa* Cajetan indeed admits that there is a difference on this point between St. Thomas, commenting on Aristotle, and St. Thomas, author of the *Summa*, and that we must seek the true Thomistic thought in the last named. As a matter of fact, the act of prudence is an intellectual act. We must doubtless know the concrete and individual in order to place it, but we must also know the universal. Yet the cogitative, because it is no more than a sensible faculty, is fundamentally incapable of any abstract and universal cognition. The intellect, however, undoubtedly has the universal as formal and direct object, but it also has a certain indirect and reflex knowledge of the singular material thing.

We would thus be wrong in thinking that the particular minor of the prudential syllogism is elaborated by the cogitative alone. Indeed not! An act of the intellect has its place here, but it is an indirect act of intellectual knowledge of the singular material thing. In this act, as in all other acts of this kind, the intellect turns itself back on the phantasm whence was drawn the intelligible species which put the intellect in act. This phantasm is the product of the cogitative, helped by imagination and memory. Besides, the human person, the single knowing subject, while it has the universal knowledge of the object—for instance, detraction—through the intellect, finds this same notion embodied in the phantasm which it reaches by means of the cogitative as perfected by memory and experience. In working out the prudential minor the cogitative can be said to serve as instrument to the intellect. St. Thomas is therefore correct in insisting that prudence first and above all perfects the intellect, and only secondarily perfects the cogitative. And just as a better tool in the hands of an artist will produce a better result, so a more experienced cogitative will enable the reason to perform acts of more consummate prudence. A person thus endowed will give wiser counsels, will be more just in his judgments, will act more opportunely. The law governing the relations between instrumental and principal cause will be active here; the statue is wholly the product of both the chisel and the sculptor; these acts of prudence, in the words of Cajetan, “*principaliter sunt intellectus, ministerialiter autem cogitativae*.”³⁰

²⁸ Cf. *In III De Anima*, lect. 4 #644; *In I Meta.*, lect. 1 #11; *De Ver.*, q. 15, a. 1; q. 24 a. 2; q. 25 a. 2.

²⁹ Cf. the text quoted above in note 24 which goes on as follows: “Non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subiecto principali, sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quamdam autem applicationem pertingit ad huiusmodi sensum.”

³⁰ Cf. Cajetan, *In II-II S. T.*, q. 47, a. 3 (Leon. ed.), vol. VIII, p. 351.

This, then, is how the cogitative has a very special place in the act of prudence. Because of this part which it plays, most important among the senses and indispensable for the intellect, St. Thomas calls it not only *ratio particularis* but *intellectus* as well, implying a sort of higher dignity. We know that for the Angelic Doctor the intellect which knows first principles without any reasoning process is opposed to discursive *ratio* and is called *intellectus* in the strictest sense of the term, or *intellectus principiorum*.³¹ Nevertheless these principles, specific objects of the *intellectus*, either implicitly or explicitly serve as starting points for the process of *ratio*, and are the last point to which the demonstration can be traced back. With this in mind St. Thomas, both in his *Summa* and in his commentaries on Aristotle, calls these first principles *extrema*: "Intellectus in utraque cognitione, scilicet tam in speculatione quam in practica, est extremorum, quia primorum terminorum et extremorum a quibus scilicet ratio incipit."³²

With these facts established, let us remember that in the prudential act the cogitative constructs the particular or singular minor. Now the cogitative knows the singular without any reasoning or discursive process and therefore passes upon its judgments which are "absolute," taking this word as synonymous for immediate judgments.³³ Again, the universal is taken from the singular by abstraction. This is already enough for this singular minor to be worthy of the name of principle, and consequently, extreme, especially as the practical intellect has these singulars as the goal of its processes. Which gives us the reason why St. Thomas, using a legitimate analogy, boldly transposes the term *intellectus* from the domain of the spiritual to that of the sensible and corporeal and applies it to the cogitative: "Sicut pertinet ad intellectum in universalibus iudicium absolutum de primis principiis . . . ita et circa singularia vis cogitativa vocatur intellectus secundum quod habet absolutum iudicium de singularibus."³⁴

Nor is this all. The singular minor of the prudential syllogism aims at a practical conclusion, and therefore at an end, with which, if known formally as a minor, it is already full and pregnant. It may even be said that this minor itself expresses an end in this sense, not a universal end—the synderesis expresses this in the major—but a particular end embodied in the concrete act suggested by prudence, a particular end which is consequently a means judged apt to lead to the general end, either in the order of some virtue, such as justice, or simply in the order of human nature. It can therefore quite legitimately be said that the intellect which enters into the prudential act is a correct estimate of a particular end. And so, looking at it from another angle, this minor, inasmuch as it is a singular final cause, is worthy of the name of principle and extreme, and the cogitative which constructs it may be called *intellectus*.³⁵

³¹ Cf. my book *Intellectus et Ratio selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, which takes this idea for its principal thesis; especially to be consulted are Part II, c. 3; and Part III, c. 2.

³² Cf. *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 9 §1247.

³³ This term, absolute judgment, is a technical term in St. Thomas used to designate the angelic cognition inasmuch as it proceeds without *discursus* or reasoning; he applies it to our human cognition to designate the act of our *intellectus*. Cf. my *Intellectus et Ratio* quoted above, p. 47.

³⁴ Cf. *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 9 §1255, already quoted a number of times.

³⁵ Cf. *S. T.*, II-II. 49. 2. The same doctrine in ad 3 and in the commentary of the passage quoted by the *Summa* (Pirotta ed.), §1248.

All of which enables us to conclude with Cajetan in his two-line commentary on the second article of the *Secunda-Secundae*, question forty-nine: "In articulo secundo, habetur quod prudentiae principium et conclusio est in cogitativa."³⁶ For it is from the singular minor, formed by the cogitative as we have explained, that the prudential act flows, and it is in a particular conclusion obtained through this same cogitative that the prudential act culminates.

CONCLUSION

It is now time to attempt to answer the questions we raised at the beginning of our study. What is the true part played by the cogitative? The cogitative is not merely the sense of the useful or the harmful, in the narrow meaning in which the examples so often repeated and, indeed, taken from the animal world would lead us all too easily to understand it. It is also, and in St. Thomas' opinion more so, perhaps, the sense of the individual grasped under the aspect of its reality as a concrete individual. The cogitative gathers this individual element, organizes it, and from it constructs experience in the order of technique as well as in that of moral conduct enlightened by prudence. With good reason does P. Noble say of it: "It is the master faculty of practical people, of artisans, of people who know how to do things; it is the sense of fortunate discoveries, happy combinations, success in action."³⁷ Indeed it is with action, essentially individual, that the cogitative is particularly concerned. And since action is fundamentally nothing other than the incarnation of a tendency toward a concrete good, the cogitative, in spite of this broader concept of it, still remains the internal sense of the good proper to the individual, and consequently proper to the entire species.

As the sense of the individual, the cogitative—with the aid it receives from imagination and memory—is at the origin of the phantasm whence in the last analysis the universal concept will be drawn. It is also through the cogitative that the thinking subject, turning back upon these same phantasms, observes the continuity existing between the abstract idea and the phantasm on one hand, and on the other between the abstract idea and the real extrinsic object the perception of which has been furnished to it by the external senses. The cogitative is therefore a real liaison agent between the spiritual world of our ideas and the corporeal world of our senses. Consequently, the more exact the work of the cogitative, the keener can our intellectual knowledge become. This throws light on the statement of P. J. Webert, O.P.: "... it is a priceless instrument for the intellect, whether there be question of speculation or of action. It can be affirmed that there is no really powerful intellect, be it speculative or active, without a cogitative at once very swift and exact."³⁸

If this is the case, it would be a mistake to follow Suarez³⁹ in considering the cogitative as a mere copy of the estimative of animals, a bit more perfected by reason of its proximity to reason. No doubt

³⁶ Cf. Cajetan's commentary on this text of the *Summa* (Leon. ed., vol. VIII, p. 368).

³⁷ Cf. Noble, O.P., *La Prudence*, French translation of the *Summa Theologica*, II-II, q. 47 to 52, explanatory notes on q. 47, a. 3, p. 243 (Paris: 1926).

³⁸ Cf. J. Webert, O.P., *L'ame humaine*, French translation of the *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 75-83, technical notes, p. 383 (Paris: 1925).

³⁹ Cf. Suarez, text quoted above, note 50.

there is still truth in the proportion: the cogitative is to man what the estimative is to the animal. We must not for that reason forget the abyss created by intelligence between these two classes of beings, nor must we forget that as a result the cogitative is rightly called the particular reason and the intellect of the individual, both of which formulas, in St. Thomas' opinion, indicate the altogether special part played by this internal sense in our human intellection, a part which in no sense finds a parallel in the animal estimative.

One would also find himself on the wrong track if he were to identify the cogitative with instinct as the Moderns understand it. Take the definition of instinct given by W. James: "Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the ends and without previous education in the performance"; or, again, that found in the *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie*, published by Andre Lalande: "The complex combination of exterior, determined, hereditary reactions, common to all the individuals of a same species and adapted to an end of which the being which acts is not generally conscious."⁴⁰ Let this concept be compared with the notion of the cogitative that resulted from our present study.

Instinct is a combination of external and internal cognitions, of appetites and local movements of all kinds; the cogitative is an internal faculty of cognition, and nothing more than that. Instinct implies no consciousness of an end to be reached, or even, in many cases, of the means or movements useful to reach the end; the cogitative, on the contrary, is essentially founded on consciousness. Instinct, though not altogether impervious to improvement, remains, in all its essential elements, incapable of true progress. By its very nature the cogitative perfects itself in speed of action, sureness of vision, richness of experience, and thus prepares an ever more perfect instrument for intellectual progress. Instinct serves vegetative life in particular, and makes certain the development and conservation of the individual, and through him of the species. The cogitative, though it is far from being of no use whatever to this side of man, aims particularly at placing the inferior portion (vegetative and sensitive) at the service of the superior and rational portion, thus contributing to the good of the whole, the complete and ordered satisfaction of all the faculties of the human person.

Undoubtedly the cogitative can play its part in the domain of instinct, in the case of man. We saw that this was the case when we considered its relations with the sensible appetite and with the play of strictly spontaneous movements (the *primo-primi* movements of the scholastics). But it is more often outside of these so called instinctive movements that the cogitative exercises its action, and frequently removes whatever element of the instinctive there is in them and places them as quickly as possible under the domination of reason.

Does this mean that there is no point of similarity between the cogitative and instinct? Such a claim would be an exaggeration in the opposite direction. There are times when the cogitative throws such clear light on the conduct to be followed that it seems to have made impossible any intervention on the part of reflex and discursive

⁴⁰ Cf. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, II (New York: 1890), p. 382, and Lalande, *Vocabulaire*, art. instinct.

reason. The action seems altogether spontaneous, prepared in no wise by experience or education. In such cases men speak of instinct, but, as is evident, in a sense quite different from that in which biologists and psychologists speak of instinct. La Rochefoucauld speaks in this sense when he says: "Some there are who by a kind of instinct whose cause they ignore make decisions on what is presented to them and always decide for the right thing."⁴¹ The truth is that such decisions must be attributed to a quick and exact view taken of concrete situations, a view which is that of the intellect, but prepared by a cogitative naturally placed in ideal conditions.

The cogitative then, not reducible to instinct or to imagination and memory, remains, in the twentieth as well as in the thirteenth century, an authentic part of the eternal human psychism. Not only is there no question of relegating it to the museum of antiquities, but it must take up again in our psychology the place so generously marked out for it by St. Thomas Aquinas.

It is true that the Moderns know nothing about this cogitative. But what does that prove? It proves nothing, absolutely nothing, against its existence and its nature. In fact, we might expect them to know nothing about it, considering the purely experimental and positive, not to say positivistic direction which psychological studies since the nineteenth century have chosen to take. As a faculty, the cogitative does not fall within the scope of positive science. As for its operation, it is so easily confused on the one hand with that of the imagination and memory, by which it is always helped, and on the other with that of the intellect, behind which it hides, as it were, that minds with a bias for observed facts would naturally fail to single it out. Add to that the anti-metaphysical prejudices with which Auguste Comte has imbued the minds of our era. It was quite natural, then, that the cogitative should be branded as one of those metaphysical entities, those personified abstractions for which the positivistic mind can never find enough scorn. It is high time to realize, as P. Webert, O.P., put it so well in the passage already quoted³⁸ that:

in a Thomistic theory of the internal senses there are two faculties (the *sensus communis* and the cogitative), which have been laid aside in favor of their connected faculties, the imagination and the memory, which hold the principal roles. Because they are faculties of synthesis, both of them, and not powers of mere repetition, their nature is subtle enough to pass unnoticed. But from the fact that they reintegrate in sensible cognition a synthetic function, the study of them once developed cannot fail to put back into this cognition a unifying principle of which recent observations give no hint.

On this point as well as on many others Thomism, understood in all its breadth, might give satisfaction to minds left unsatisfied by the too purely material progress of our time.

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⁴¹ de la Rochefoucauld, *Maximes Diverses*, c. 10, "On Taste."

A STUDY OF GENUS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

(Continued from March Issue)

Part Three: PRINCIPLES OF GENUS, DIFFERENCE, AND SPECIES IN INTELLIGIBLE BEING

IN THIS third and final movement of what we have described as a basic study of genus we shall determine the principles of genus, difference, and species, in intelligible being. The first stage of our inquiry, concerning the modes of predication of genus difference and species, is properly the work of the Logician. The second and third stages are the work of the Metaphysician, for both are studies of the principles of a kind of being: in the second article we studied the principles of being *per se* in the first mode; in the present article we shall study the principles of being *per se* in the second mode, the being which a thing has in an intellect. For being *per se* is said in two ways:

In enunciation, then, the thing known exists in one of the two modes of being *per se*. And thus very frequently St. Thomas teaches that being *per se* is two-fold: one which signifies the essence or entity of the thing, the being which signifies something existing in the nature of things, is *ens naturae*, and is divided by the ten genera; the other is that which signifies the truth of the proposition, or the truth of propositions, which signifies the truth of composition, or the truth of the proposition which consists in composition, and as against *ens naturae* is *ens rationis*.¹

Thus *to be* is two-fold: there is the *to be* which is the act of being and is the *ipse actus essentiae*, and there is the *to be* which signifies the composition of an *intellectus*, the composition of a proposition which the soul comes upon conjoining predicate to subject, the *to be* which signifies the truth of the proposition, the truth of the composition of the proposition.²

Although this being *per se* of the second mode, *being true*, is achieved perfectly only in the second act of intellect, yet within the order of the first act, the order of concepts, whose object is essence, and whose work or *word* is the definition, there is a certain degree of intelligible being. As matter and form, principles of being which things have in nature, are a kind of imperfect being; so the concepts, principles of the enunciation, are a kind of imperfect intelligible being. Moreover, as in the whole order of intentional or intelligible being there is an ordering of that which is imperfect, potential, and a kind of principle (the first act of intellect) to that which is perfect, actual, and terminal (the second act of intellect, in which truth is attained, and in which the intellect may rest as at its term)³ so within the first act of intellect itself, there is an ordering of imperfect to perfect, of principle to term. The term, the perfection of knowledge of the first act, of intellect, is the definition which is given by proximate genus and specific difference: for such a definition is the most perfect expression of the essence of the thing, which is the object of the

¹ B. J. Muller-Thym, "The *To Be* Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XVI (1940), 234. See the texts cited in this place.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238, with the texts cited in the notes.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 231-234.

first act. The imperfect knowledge from which we approach such a definition is that universal, generic, indeterminate knowledge which is first acquired. We shall confine our study to this ordering within the first act of intellect, in which we find a manifold of actuations, as the same nature exists in many modes of knowledge. We shall consider these many degrees of knowledge not according to the modes of predication but as a kind of intentional being whose principles we shall determine.

NATURE IN INTELLIGIBLE BEING AND IN THINGS

The ultimate subject of all being and of all predication—that is, of all being *per se* in the first and second modes—is prime substance. It is clear that substance is the ultimate subject of all being in nature, for it underlies not only all accidental being, but also all so-called second substance: the generic and specific natures which are concentered in the singular *res naturae* or supposite, as we have already seen.⁴ A thing is simply by the actuation which it receives through its substantial form; in addition it may be of a certain magnitude or disposition, etc., by reason of the accidental forms which further determine it.⁵ All accidents are naturally ordered to be in a substance as subject; and although in a sense one accident may be in another, as for example qualities are in the quantitative accidents which precede them in the determination of substance; yet no accident *per se* is the subject of another: all have their being ultimately in the substance as subject.⁶

Although it is less evident, it is no less true that the ultimate subject of all predication, the subject of all being *per se* in the second mode, is likewise prime substance, the singular existent in nature.⁷

Moreover, as prime substance is the cause of its accidents in that being which is in nature,⁸ it is also the cause of knowledge, that is, of the intentional being which it exercises in the intellect in which it is known. For the thing in nature is the measure of the truth of the intellect: it is the specifying principle of knowledge, and is somehow an efficient cause through the mediation of the phantasm. Not only is the *esse* of the thing the cause of truth in judgment; but the structure of the thing in nature, its composition of matter and form, and of substance and accident, determines the modes of knowledge in which it exists in the human intellect.⁹ Our present study, consequently, will parallel the analysis which we made in the preceding chapter. We are concerned now with the same nature of essence as it is found in intelligible being.

⁴ Cf. "A Study of Genus," II, *The Modern Schoolman*, XX (March, 1943), pp. 173-175; 180-181.

⁵ Cf. *S. T.*, I. 77. 6 resp. et ad 2; 7 resp. et ad 2; III. 77. 2 ad 1.

⁶ *S. T.*, III. 77. 2 ad 1; I. 77. 1 ad 2.

⁷ This has been demonstrated by Doctor Muller-Thym in the article cited, pp. 249-254.

⁸ Substance is the material cause of all its accidents; it is the final cause and somehow the efficient cause of its proper accidents. "Ad secundum dicendum, quod subjectum est causa proprii accidentis, et finalis, et quodammodo activa, et etiam materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis . . ." *S. T.*, I. 77. 6 ad 2.

⁹ Cf. *S. T.*, I. 85. 5 resp. et ad 3; *In X Meta.*, lect. 2 #1956-1959; IX., lect. 11 #1896-1898. Although this last text refers to the disposition of the thing as

TWOFOLD CONSIDERATION OF NATURE

Nature or essence may be considered in two ways:¹⁰ (1) according to its own proper character; (2) according to the being which it has in this or that thing. In the first consideration of nature we may affirm truly of it only those things which belong *per se* to the nature: this is the absolute consideration of nature.

The text of *De Ente* IV offers some difficulty in the apparently indifferent way in which essence or nature is signified as *quo est* and as *quod est*, i.e. with or without precision. It would seem that if we are to consider the nature absolutely, it should be signified as *quo est*: as the essential principles with precision of anything not belonging to the essence *per se*. Thus nature is considered prior to its being concreted in a subject. Signified as *quod est*, as concreted in an indeterminate subject, the nature still includes *per se* only the essential principles; but it includes indeterminately the signate matter of the subjects in which it may be concreted.¹¹ It is clear why St. Thomas uses the nature as *quod est* in this text. He is illustrating what predication may be made by reason of the nature itself. Thus we may say "Man is animal" by reason of his nature. But we may not say "Man is white" in the same way. St. Thomas' chief concern here is the exclusion of accidents which follow on the mode of being which the nature has either in the intellect or in things. Thus *universal*, *species*, *white*, and *tall* are accidental to the nature. We predicate human nature of John without predicating of him the accidental character which the nature may have in an intellect: we do not say "John is a species." Nor do we include such accidents as *white* when we predicate man of an Abyssinian. It would seem that this is the limit of St. Thomas' consideration here.

The difficulty of the text arises only when we seek further to determine whether the nature considered absolutely should be signified preferably as *quo est* or as *quod est*. Without going into a lengthy consideration of this chapter of the *De Ente*, we may make this much clear:

(1) Whether the nature be signified as *quo est* (*humanitas*) or as *quod est* (*homo*), the same essential principles are signified *per se*.

(2) Even in the texts of *De Ente* where the nature considered absolutely is signified as *quod est*, the criterion of what belongs to man as man is the nature signified as *quo est*:

. . . Verbi gratia homini, in eo quod est homo, convenit rationale et animal et alia quae in eius definitione cadunt; album vero vel nigrum, vel quidquid huiusmodi quod non est de ratione *humanitatis*, non convenit homini in eo quod est homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est: quia utrumque est extra intellectum *humanitatis*, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. . . . (*De Ente* IV, pp. 26-27)

cause of the truth in the second act of intellect, still it is true also for that intelligible being which is had in the first act of intellect, in which the intellect cannot be false, since it is united with the intelligible form of the thing as potency is united with act. The intellect is put in act by the intelligible form of the thing, which is the principle of the intellect's operation, and is the specifying principle in the concept. The substantial and accidental nature of the thing known, therefore, is clearly a cause of all knowledges within the order of concept.

¹⁰ *De Ente* IV, pp. 26-27 (Boyer ed.; Rome: Univ. Greg., 1933).

¹¹ Cf. "A Study of Genus," II, *loc. cit.*

... Si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas, inveniretur communitas; et hoc falsum est, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quidquid est in eo individuaturn est. . . . (p. 28)

(3) The chief concern in this text is not the question of which manner of signifying nature is prior, but rather the question of what is to be predicated of a thing according to its nature.

(4) In the further question of which is the better way to signify the nature considered absolutely, we must distinguish: (a) no doubt the nature is signified first as *quo est*, for thus it is considered prior even to concretion in an indeterminate subject, as we shall see later in our discussion; (b) if, however, the nature is to be predicated as it is in the text in question, it is still the same nature, but it is regarded as concreted in a subject, and actually it has received an intention of predicability.

The second manner of considering nature is according to the *esse* which it may have either in singulars or in the intellect. We have determined in the preceding chapter what mode of *esse* the nature has in the singular *res naturae*. There is a composition of nature and individuating principles in the supposite, together with further compositions with the accidents following on the nature. The nature is the determining principle of the *res naturae*, the source of its proper accidents, generic and specific. The composite *res naturae*, therefore, is exercising many acts of being: in the genus of substance by its single substantial form it is virtually many (substance, body, living) and it is further actuated in the many genera of accidents. The ultimate subject of all such being is prime matter, pure potency which can never be fully actuated by one form, but remains always in potency to all other natural forms, and is the root of the mutual action of bodies, of generation and corruption and succession of forms in material things.

In the being which such a nature has in the human intellect we find a remarkable correspondence to that being which it has in the *res naturae*. For our intellect, proportioned to its object, the quiddity of material things, is the least of all intellects, and has some analogy to prime matter.¹² For it is none of the things which it knows, but is in potency to the knowledge of all, and is moved from potency to act by the intelligible forms of things.¹³ It is never fully actuated by one form, for its object is being, and only an infinite species could comprehend that object: rather it knows by a succession of forms,¹⁴ each of which is the principle of an operation. Consequently, as in things in nature, so in intellect there is a kind of generation, or rather many analogies to generation. Each act of knowledge is a kind of conception, in which the intellect, fecundated by the intelligible species, generates its word, the likeness of the thing known.¹⁵ Within the order of the first act of intellect there is an analogy to generation in the succession of actuations from imperfect to perfect, as we shall note

¹² *In I Physic.*, lect. 1 #7; *In III De Anima*, lect. 9 #722; *S. T.*, I. 79. 2 resp.; I-II. 50. 6 resp.; I. 85. 3 resp.; *De Ente* V, p. 41.

¹³ *In II Sent.*, 3. 3. 3 ad 1 (Mand. ed), vol. II, 121-122.

¹⁴ Cf. *S. T.*, I. 85. 3 resp.; 85. 5 resp.; II-II. 180, 3 resp.; *In II Sent.*, 3. 3. 1 sol.; *Sum. c. Gent.*, III. 20.

¹⁵ Cf. Rev. Gerald B. Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1941), pp. 5, 46 (n. 10).

later. Finally, in the third act, properly reason, the generation of conclusion from principle is analogous to generation in nature.¹⁶

Beyond this multiplicity and succession and quasi generation, there is a further characteristic in which the human intellect resembles matter, and as a consequence of which oddly enough we cannot know matter except universally. Since our participation of the divine *lumen* is not sufficient to give us the species of things, our intellect must receive its intelligible forms from things in nature as they are made actually intelligible under the energization of the agent intellect. Our knowledge depends, therefore, on the action of sensible things upon our cognitive powers. Since a thing can act only in so far as it is in act, and things in nature are in act not by their matter but by their forms, they can effect only a formal representation or *similitudo* in our intellect.¹⁷ This is the ultimate explanation of our inability to have direct intellectual knowledge of the singular; for although it is true that the root of all intelligibility is immateriality,¹⁸ and that the singular may be said to be unintelligible not by reason of its singularity, but by reason of its materiality; still, if we are to explain how the Divine and angelic intellect may know the material singular directly with an immaterial mode of knowledge, we must come to the solution which we have indicated: the difference between knowledges which are by *species factivae* and knowledges which are by *species acceptae a rebus*. This is the full explanation of the many texts which explain our inability to know the singular directly by indicating that our knowledge is by abstraction from individual matter: our species is the intelligible form or species of the thing, in which matter is known only universally (*materia communis*).¹⁹

PRINCIPLES OF THE NATURE IN INTELLIGIBLE BEING

This preliminary view of the mode of human intellection leads us to that stage of our inquiry in which we may discover the kind of being which a nature has in the intellect, and the close analogy between this *esse* and its *esse* in the *res naturae*.

Since, as we have seen, our participation of the Divine *lumen* is the least of all intellects, we have only an agent intellect which can render actually intelligible those objects which as they are present to us in sense and phantasm are only potentially intelligible. The agent intellect, therefore, is the pure source of immateriality and actual intelligibility; but we depend for the specifying principle of our knowledge upon the natures of the things we know. It is the intelligible form, the *natura speciei*, or *species*, *similitudo*, *quidditas* of material things, abstract from individual, signate matter, which is the specifying principle of our knowledge.²⁰ This *quidditas rei materialis* is the object of our intellect: it is the same nature which in the *res naturae* is concreted in individual matter and is the principle of other accidents in the supposite; and which in the intellect is free from indi-

¹⁶ *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 3 (Vives ed.), vol. XXII, 110b; *Ibid.*, lect. 2; *In VII Meta.*, lect. 8 #1450.

¹⁷ *De Verit.*, II. 5 (Marietti ed.), vol. III, 46ab. Cf. *ibid.*, VIII. 11 resp.; *In I Sent.*, 36. 1. 1 sol. (Mand. ed.), 831-832.

¹⁸ *Sum. c. Gent.*, II. 75 "Non enim hoc . . ." (Leonine man. ed.), 180 ab; *S. T.*, I. 56. 1 ad 2; *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 47; *De Verit.*, II. 9; *S. T.*, I. 79. 3 resp.; 84. 2 resp.; 87. 1 ad 3.

¹⁹ Cf. *S. T.*, I. 14. 11 ad 1; 86. 1 resp.; *De Verit.*, II. 6 resp., et *passim*.

²⁰ *S. T.*, I. 85. 2 resp.; I. 17. 3 resp.; *De Verit.*, II. 6. resp.

vidual matter and the conditions of matter, and is the principle of many modes of knowledge, in which it takes on certain accidental characteristics proper to that mode of being.

At the very threshold of intelligible being, prior to any intention of universality, we find a likeness, species, intelligible form, which represents only the nature of the thing known, not the individuating principles.²¹ It is the same nature which in this or that man is concreted in singular matter, and which in the intellect may be regarded as one, with a relation to many subjects to which it is common and of which it may be predicated. Of itself, considered absolutely, the nature is neither singular nor universal.

What, then, is the intention of universality which is added to the nature as it exists in the intellect, free from the conditions of matter? The word *intention* is one of the most difficult terms in medieval philosophy. Its most important meanings in St. Thomas are these:²²

(1) "Attention":

Respondeo dicendum quod, quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radican- tur, necesse est quod quando *intentio* animae vehementer trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione alterius. . . .²³

(2) An act of the will:

. . . Intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in aliud tendere . . . primo et principaliter pertinet ad id quod movet ad finem . . . proprie est actus voluntatis.²⁴

(3) "Relation," *habitus*, *ratio*:

. . . Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta; . . . necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. . . . Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensus non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa.²⁵

Ad quartum dicendum, quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere; quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest.²⁶

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod universale dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis (ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa) proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit posterius. . . .²⁷

(4) *Species*, *similitudo*:

. . . Intentio formae sensibilis . . . in organo sensus. . . .²⁸

Intentio intellecta, intellectus, intellectualis, intelligibilis.²⁹

(5) *Conceptio*, *ratio*, "concept":

Uterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam inten-

²¹ S. T., I. 85. 1 ad 3 (558a); ad 4; 85. 2 ad 2; 85. 3 ad 1.

²² Cf. L. Schütz, *Thomas Lexikon* (Paderborn: 1895).

²³ S. T., I-II. 37. 1 resp.; cf. 38. 2 resp.; 77. 1 resp.; *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 55; *De Verit.*, XIII 3 resp.

²⁴ S. T., I-II. 12. 1 resp.; cf. 12. 2. 3; *In II Sent.*, 38. 1. 3 sol.; *De Verit.*, XXII. 13 ad 16.

²⁵ S. T., I. 78. 4 resp. ²⁶ S. T., I. 76. 3 ad 4. ²⁷ S. T., 85. 3 ad 1.

²⁸ S. T., 78. 3 resp.; cf. I-II. 5. 6 ad 2; 22. 2 resp.

²⁹ Cf. S. T., I. 85. 1 ad 4; *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 53; IV. 11, 26.

tionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio. . .

Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium: licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem. . .³⁰

There is a noticeable similarity of the third, fourth, and fifth meanings of *intentio*: all pertain to a kind of intentional being, as opposed to being in nature. Thus, a sensible form is called an *intentio* only as it is in the sense, and an intelligible form is called an *intentio* only as it is in the intellect. In general, therefore, *intentio* as applied to intelligible being would seem to indicate a form or nature either as the intelligible species or as it is in the concept which the intellect forms. In every case, *intentio* names the nature not directly, nor as signifying the proper character of the nature, but in consequence of its being in the intellect. Like *ratio* and *definitio*, *intentio* refers to the nature as it is *in re* only mediately.³¹ In this sense, every concept is an intention, as every intelligible species is an intention.

But in a special sense, as indicated in the third group of meanings, *intentio* signifies a certain relation, *respectus*, *habitus*, which follows on the nature according to its *esse* in the intellect. In this special sense we speak of the intention of universality, of genus, species, or difference; and also of opposition: the intentions of contrariety, privation, relation. Leaving aside a number of vexed questions concerning intentions,³² we may give some sufficient indication of what we mean by the intentions of universality, of genus, difference, and species, and show how these intentions are related to the nature.

³⁰ *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 53 (Leon. man. ed.), p. 50a; cf. *De Verit.*, XXI. 3. obj. 5 et ad 5.

³¹ "Quantum ad primum pertinet, sciendum est, quod ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicuius nominis: . . . Nec tamen hoc nomen 'ratio' significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hic nomen 'definitio', et alia nomina secundae impositionis.

Ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet, qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. Non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extra animam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo.

. . . Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis "genus" non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequitur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi . . ." *In I Sent.*, 2. 1. 3 sol. (Mand. ed.), vol. I, 66-67.

Cf. *In III Sent.*, 5.3. 1 ad 1, "Intentio sec."; *In IV Physic.*, lect. 17, "Intentio animae;" *De Pot.* I. 1 ad 10, "Intentio;" *S. T.*, I. 85, 5 ad 4; 76. 3 ad 4.

³² Among these questions we should include the question concerning the proper use of such expressions as *prima intentio*, *secunda intentio*, *prima impositio*, *secunda impositio*, *de secundis intellectis*, etc.

Cf. *In I Sent.*, 23. 1. 3 sol.; 26. 1. 1 ad 3; 26. 2. 1 sol.; *In III Sent.*, 5. 3. 1 ad 1; 6. 1. 1 sol. 1.

In the strict sense of intention which we shall employ, the nature, for example *humanitas*, neither is an intention, nor has an intention as we find it in both the intelligible species and the *verbum* as the first datum of knowledge. The nature signified as *quo est* is prior even to the nature signified as *quod est*, as the abstract is prior to the concrete.³³

Not only does it not have any intentionality at this stage of knowledge, but it cannot receive an intention of universality or predicability until it is regarded as concentered in a subject. For *humanitas* and *animalitas* are not the *quod quid est*, but are the principles of the *quod quid est*, that is, of the species and the genus.³⁴ How, then, do we trace the steps by which the nature is signified as *quod est* and receives the intentions of predicability?

THE PHANTASM AND THE INTENTIONS OF PREDICABILITY

We must understand at the outset certain conditions of our human mode of intellection. Just as the nature is the specifying principle of our knowledge, and continues to be the specifying principle through all the operations of intellect and reason; and as the agent intellect is the pure act of intelligibility which is the constant source of intelligibility at all stages of our knowledge; so the phantasm is a principle of our knowledge, not as a transient principle which is required at some one stage of our intellectual and rational operations, but as a permanent and abiding principle of our knowledge, which is necessary at every stage.³⁵ For, as in the singular thing a nature subsists only as it is received in individual matter, so in the intellect the nature can exist only as it is made present to the intellect by the phantasm representing it in its concretion in individual, signate matter. Though the object of the intellect is the quiddity or nature of the thing, yet the intellect cannot behold its object without turning, as it were, to the phantasm, in which alone it finds the nature. Naturally, therefore, in the intellect, a nature takes on a character proportioned to that which it has in its *esse* in the singular.

³³ "Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis *humanitas* non sit sine homine, tamen est prius naturaliter quam homo, quia per eam dicitur aliquis esse homo . . ." *In III Sent.*, 5. 3. 1 ad 4 (Moos ed.), vol. III, 205.

³⁴ "Sciendum est etiam ad evidentiam eorum, quae dicta sunt, quod quod quid est esse est id quod definitio significat. Unde, cum definitio praedicatur de definito, oportet quod quid est esse de definito praedicari. Non igitur est quod quid est esse hominis *humanitas* quae de homine non praedicatur sed animal rationale mortale. *Humanitas* enim non respondetur quaerenti quid est homo, sed animal rationale et mortale. Sed tamen *humanitas* accipitur ut principium formale ejus, quod quid erat esse; sicut *animalitas* sumitur ut principium generis, et non genus; *rationalitas* ut principium differentiae, et non ut differentia.

Humanitas autem pro tanto non est omnino idem cum homine, quia importat tantum principia essentialia hominis, et exclusionem omnium accidentium. Est enim *humanitas*, qua homo est homo: nullum autem accidentium hominis est, quo homo sit homo: unde omnia accidentia hominis excluduntur a significatione humanitatis. Hoc autem ipsum quod est homo, est quod habet principia essentialia, et cui possunt accidentia inesse. Unde, licet in significatione hominis non includantur accidentia ejus, non tamen homo significat aliquid separatum ab accidentibus; et ideo homo significat ut totum, *humanitas* significat ut pars.

Si autem est aliqua res, in qua non sit aliquod accidens, ibi necesse est, quod nihil differat abstractum a concreto . . ." *In VII Meta.*, lect. 5 #1378-1380.

³⁵ "Ad quintum dicendum, quod phantasma est principium nostrae cognitionis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio non sicut transiens, sed sicut permanens,

The first requisite for its *esse* in the intellect is that the nature be signified as *quod est*, as concreted in a subject. Without such signification as *animal* or *homo*, the nature cannot function in knowledge; for it cannot be predicated, nor can it receive any of the special intentions of predicability, unless it is signified as a whole, predicable of a whole.³⁶ Passing over the question whether or not we have a concept *animalitas* prior in time to *animal*, we must say that *animalitas* as the formal principle is prior to *animal*, just as in the singular thing *humanitas* is prior to *homo*, though it can never exist except in *homine*.³⁷ *Animalitas* and *humanitas* have a priority in intelligible being also, as the formal principles of the genus and the species, or as they are sometimes called, the *natura generis* and *natura speciei*.³⁸ It is because the intellect can conceive the nature only by turning to the phantasm where it is represented as concreted in matter—and this is true as well in the hundredth repeated apprehension as in the first—that the nature may be signified as *quod est*. By such a change in the manner of signification no change is made in the intelligible content, but, as we have seen, the same essential principles are signified now without precision of the individual matter. Including thus indeterminately the individuating principles and whatever may be concreted with the nature in the whole supposite, the nature as *quod est* is a whole, which will be found to be predicable of many subjects.

The actual predicability or universality of the nature is a further ordering of the nature to its function in knowledge. The nature itself considered absolutely is neither singular nor universal. As it exists in the singular thing in matter, the nature is individuated, multiplied in many subjects. In the intellect, however, existing free from the conditions of matter which individuate it in things, the nature is undivided, and so may be regarded as one nature common to many.³⁹ This character of universality, of unity and community, of being one in many, is added to the nature by the intellect, and is consequent upon the mode of being which the nature has in the intellect.⁴⁰

In the discovery and formation of these intentions, as in the signification of nature as concreted in a subject, the phantasm plays an

ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis; sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut objecta in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam representationem, vel secundum negationem. Et ideo quando phantasmatum cognitio impeditur, oportet totaliter impediri cognitionem intellectus in divinis. Patet enim quod non possumus intelligere Deum causam corporum esse, sive supra omnia corpora, sive absque corporeitate, nisi imaginemur corpora, non tamen iudicium divinorum secundum imaginationem formatum. Et ideo quamvis imaginatio in qualibet divinorum cognitione sicut necessaria secundum statum viae, nunquam tamen ad eam deduci oportet in divinis." In *Boethii de Trinitate*, 6. 2 ad 5 (Mand. ed.), 134.

Cf. Muller-Thym, *The Establishment of the University of Being in the Doctrine of Meister Eckhart of Hochheim* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), p. 2; In *De Mem. et Remin.*, 2 #314; In *III De Anima*, lect. 12 #770-772; lect. 13 #791-794; S. T., I. 85. 5 ad 2; 84. 7 resp. et ad 1, 3; 85. 1 ad 5; 89. 1 resp.

³⁶ *De Ente* IV, pp. 25-26; In *VII Meta.*, lect. 5 #1378-1379.

³⁷ Cf. *supra*, note 33.

³⁸ In *VII Meta.*, lect. 5 #1378-1379, *supra*, note 34.

³⁹ *De Ente* IV, pp. 27-28; In *II De Anima*, lect. 12 #378.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, #380; *De Ente* IV, 28-29; In *I Peri.*, lect. 10; S. T., I. 85. 3 ad 1; In *III Sent.*, 5. 3. 1 ad 1 (Moos ed.), vol. 3, 205; In *I Sent.*, 2. 1. 3 sol., *supra*, note 31; *Quaest. de An.*, 4 resp.

important role. For the nature which has its being in things as divided, multiplied, individuated by signate matter, has also in the intellect its relation of one to many, its intention of universality, because the intellect, which knows the nature undivided as its object, finds that object only as it is represented by the phantasm as concreted in this or that signate matter. It is by reason of the continuity of the sensitive and intellective parts of man that a nature which for the intellect *per se* is undivided may be compared with the many subjects in which it is concreted in singular things and in the life of sense and phantasm, and may thus be known to the intellect as common to many subjects. In this way the nature achieves in the intellect a community corresponding to its plurality in things.

There is not one intention of universality or predicability, but many, since the nature may be known indeterminately or determinately, and may therefore be predicated as genus, difference, or species,⁴¹ as we have observed in our study of the modes of predication. A genus or species, therefore, is the nature in its intelligible existence taken together with the intention of predicability as genus or species.

RELATIONSHIP OF GENUS, DIFFERENCE, SPECIES AND INDIVIDUAL IN THE ORDER OF CONCEPTS

Our task remains in our investigation of this order of intelligible being: to determine the relationship of these various stages of knowledge in which the same nature may be known as genus, difference, species, and even individual, much as we determined the relation of generic, specific, and individual nature in the *res naturae*.

In the multiplicity and succession of acts of intelligible being within the order of concepts we find a progression from knowledge which is more universal, indistinct, indeterminate, to that which is more particular, distinct, determinate. There is in the life of intellect a development from a state of pure potency with respect to its intellection through a number of intermediate stages of imperfect actuation to that final state in which the intellect will possess its object perfectly.

This manner of gradual determination is proportioned to the *via generationis* proper to material things.⁴²

Though there is a way in which our knowledge may be said to begin with the particular, since all our knowledge has its origin in sensation,⁴³ yet within the realm of intelligible being our first knowledge is more universal, and consequently imperfect, potential, indeterminate with respect to the more particular knowledge.⁴⁴ Knowing man as *body* or as *animal*, we are still in potency to a more determinate knowledge of his nature. Knowledge by genus, therefore, is always potential and imperfect.⁴⁵ It is determined and perfected by the difference constituting a species, and ultimately by the specific difference, the last difference, which expresses the nature in its full determination,

⁴¹ *De Pot.*, I. 1 ad 10; *In III Sent.*, 5. 3. 1 ad 1; *De Ente* IV; *In VII Meta.*, lect. 13 #1570.

⁴² *S. T.*, I. 85. 3 resp.; *In I Physic.*, lect. 1 #1; *S. T.*, I. 85. 5 resp.; 79. 2 resp.; *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 3.

⁴³ *S. T.*, I. 85. 3 resp.

⁴⁴ In human intellection knowledge is imperfect and confused in proportion to its universality; in this respect our intellect differs from the angelic and Divine intellects. Cf. *S. T.*, I. 89. 3 resp.; 1 resp.; 55. 1 ad 3; 3 ad 2.

⁴⁵ *S. T.*, I. 76. 3 ad 4; *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 3; *In IV Sent.*, 49. 2. 1 sol.

and brings our knowledge of the essence to its term, the definition composed of proximate genus and specific difference.⁴⁶

Genus and difference, therefore, are related as potency and act, and especially as matter and form. They are not two things in the *res naturae*, but two concepts upon whose union as matter and form a third concept, the definition, results. As in every case of a union of principles as matter and form, the composite is *unum simpliciter*.⁴⁷

In the definition we reach the perfection of our knowledge in the order of concept, for the object of the first act of intellect is the essence or quiddity of material things, and in the definition that object is expressed perfectly. Just as the species is that ultimate which nature intends, and it is the species, not the individual, which pertains to the perfection of nature; so in intelligible being it is the knowledge of the species, not of the individual, which pertains to intelligible perfection.⁴⁸ The further determination of our concept to the individual nature is not made by any additional intelligible, formal determination, but by a material determination to this or that individual matter in which the nature is represented concretely in the phantasm. Though this further determination is required for the perfection of our knowledge in natural sciences and in the arts, where our judgments terminate in the singular things of sense,⁴⁹ yet it is a further perfection of our knowledge not as intellectual but as a complex of intellectual and sense knowledges.

In the mode of our knowledge of the singular material thing, therefore, there is a striking analogy to the manner in which the singular material thing has its being in nature. As we have seen, the ultimate determination of the specific nature to the individual *res naturae* is not by any formal determination in the thing, but by matter as a principle of division of the nature, so that the same nature is found in this or that individual matter. Though we were not concerned with the problem of individuation for its own sake, we did consider it in so far as such consideration was necessary to show that the determination of the specific nature to the individual is quite different from the determination of the generic nature to the specific nature, and that consequently, the specific nature is one nature found existing in things, whereas the generic nature is nothing but its species signified

⁴⁶ S. T., I. 75. 7 ad 2; *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 49; I. 50;

Cf. S. T., I. 76. 3 ad 4; 14. 6 resp.; *Quaest. de An.*, 18 resp., et ad 13; *In I Peri.*, lect. 8 #11 (Leon. ed.); *In II De Anima*, lect. 14; Muller-Thym, "The To Be Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," pp. 238-39.

⁴⁷ ". . . Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter." *In I Peri.*, lect. 8 #11 (Leon. ed.).

Cf. *ibid.*, I. lect. 10 #10, #23; *De Ente* III, p. 22; *In II De Anima*, lect. 14; Muller-Thym, "The To Be Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," pp. 238-239; S. T., I. 76. 3 ad 4; I-II. 18. 7 ad 3.

⁴⁸ "Unde considerandum est, quod eo modo quo aliquid est de perfectione naturae, eo modo ad perfectionem intelligibilem pertinet; singularia namque non sunt de perfectione naturae propter se, sed propter aliud; scilicet ut in eis salventur species quas natura intendit. Natura enim intendit generare hominem, non hunc hominem; nisi in quantum homo non potest esse nisi sit hic homo . . . quasi solum id quod est in specie, sit de intentione naturae, unde cognoscere species rerum pertinet ad perfectionem intelligibilem; non autem cognitio individuorum nisi forte per accidens." *Quaest. de An.* 18 resp.

Cf. *Sum. c. Gen.*, I. 50; S. T., I. 85. 3 resp.

⁴⁹ S. T., I. 84. 7 resp.; I. 84. 8 resp.

indeterminately. Proportioned to the composition in the *res naturae* of nature and individual matter (the nature or essence being signified as *quo est*) we find in intelligible being a composition of nature or essence as known by the intellect, and individual matter as known by sense and phantasm. In our knowledge of the singular, therefore, concept and phantasm together make one knowledge.⁵⁰

RESUME

We may thus summarize our treatment of the principle of genus, difference, and species in intelligible being:

(1) At the threshold of intelligible being is the nature or essence, the specifying principle of our knowledge, the intelligible form which actuates our possible intellect, and which in the concept is the species by which we know the thing.

(2) This nature, which in the *res naturae* is concreted in individual matter and undergoes certain accidental determinations in its being in matter, also in its being in the intellect undergoes certain accidental determinations which are the conditions of its intelligible being.

(3) The first stage of this "conditioning" of the nature is its signification as *quod est*, as concreted in a subject. The same essential principles are signified as in the essence as *quo est*, but without precision of the individual matter of its subjects.

(4) To the nature, existing as one and undivided by reason of its abstraction from matter and the conditions of matter, are added the intentions of universality or predicability, which are a kind of relation which the nature has to the many subjects in which it exists (or can exist) outside the intellect, as one nature common to all and predicable of all.

(5) These are the intentions of genus, difference, and species, applied to the nature according to the particular modes in which it is predicable.

(6) Genus and difference are related as potency and act, as the more imperfect, potential, indeterminate and the more perfect, actual, determinate. Genus and difference together make one knowledge, the definition, which is the complex expression of the species.

(7) The perfection of our knowledge in the order of concept is attained in the definition composed of proximate genus and specific difference, in which essence or quiddity, the object of the first act of intellect, is perfectly signified.

(8) Further determination of the concept to the individual nature does not involve any further perfection of our intellectual knowledge as such, since the determination is achieved by the representation in sense and phantasm of the individual matter in which the nature is concreted. Such knowledge is had by a union of concept and phantasm, together making one knowledge.

(9) The whole structure of this intelligible being, as of the being in nature to which it is proportioned, reveals at every stage the consequences of the composition of matter and form in material substance. Just as in the preceding article of this series we sought in the *res naturae* the ultimate explanation of our knowledge by genus, difference, and species, and found that such knowledges are caused by the composition of matter and form; so here in the life of intel-

⁵⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, I. 5. 189a5.

lect, in our analysis of the principles of intelligible being, we have found a constant correspondence to that composition in things. For ours is an intellect which is pure potency in the realm of intelligible being, as prime matter is pure potency in the realm of nature. In the consequent *via abstractionis*, the reception of formal representations from sensible things, and in the kind of generation which occurs in human intellect, we find the source in intelligible being of our knowledge by genus, difference, and species.

CONCLUSION

It will not be necessary here to make a detailed summary of our conclusions, since the résumés at the end of each article have presented the conclusions of the three stages of our inquiry. Still it will be profitable to review the principal conclusions concerning genus and the generic nature, and to indicate the relation of the study which we have made to those special problems which remain unsolved.

The genus is the nature in its intelligible being, signified indeterminately as the whole thing which is, and taken together with the intention of predicability as genus. Genus differs from the *forma totius* by its manner of signifying the nature as *quod est*, without precision⁵¹ of individual matter: genus, therefore, is predicable as a whole of the whole subject, whereas the *forma totius* is not. Genus differs from the integral part (for example *body*) by its manner of signifying a certain degree of perfection without precision of further perfection: again genus is predicable of the whole, whereas the integral part is not. Genus differs from the difference by its signifying *per se* the material principle of the thing, with actuation to a certain incomplete degree, whereas the difference signifies *per se* the ultimate determination of the form: both, however, are predicable as a whole, because they do not prescind from those principles in the subject which they do not signify *per se*. The definition signifies both the material principle of the genus and the ultimate determination of the difference; it signifies the essence by a composition of terms indicating the essential principles (*rational animal*); whereas the species signifies the same essence by a single term which names the essence (*man*).

We have seen how genus is reduced to matter, and how the whole structure of our knowledge by genus, difference, and species is caused by the composition of matter and form in the essences which are the proper object of our intellect. We might describe our whole study of genus and the generic nature as a commentary on the text "*genus sumitur a materia*," for constantly we have had to seek in prime matter and the kind of being which things have in matter the ultimate explanation of our problems. Our whole work has served to reflect some light upon that principle of material substance which is the root of the limitation and multiplicity everywhere exhibited in material substance and in the intelligible being proportioned to such being in

⁵¹ I have used the term "precision" throughout this thesis in a strict sense of *exclusion* of further determination, whether *material* (thus the *forma totius* or nature as *quod est* is signified with precision, excluding individual matter) or *formal* (thus integral part signified with precision, excluding further perfection). This is the sense in which St. Thomas uses the term *praecisio* in *De Ente* III. In parallel texts he uses *praecisio*, *In I Sent.*, 23. 1. 1 sol.; *exclusio*, *In VII Meta.*, lect. 5 #1379; *praecisio*, *Quodlibet*. IX, art 2, 2 ad 1.

nature: a principle of being which for the human intellect can be luminous only with a borrowed light.

In the light of the analyses which we made in the second and third chapters of this thesis, we may say that it is in intelligible being in the human intellect alone that we find the habitat, if we may so call it, of genus. For in the human intellect alone can the genus exist as the indeterminate. In the singular things of nature there is no such principle as a generic nature: the generic nature is nothing other than its many species indeterminately signified. In the Divine and angelic intellects genus has no place, for the universal knowledge of such intellects is proper, distinct, perfect; not common, confused, and imperfect. Only in an intellect proportioned to material things, and reflecting in its own life the condition of its object, can such knowledge be found.

In this character of genus, as we noted in the citation of the great text from St. Thomas' Commentary on the *Physics*,⁵² we have some indication of the solution of the problem of natural and logical genus. We have not attempted, however, to give even a definite formulation of this problem, because the full statement of the problem would involve the study of a number of texts, and its solution would require an extended preparatory discussion beyond the scope of this series. We may indicate briefly, however, the nature of the question, and thus conclude our own study by showing its relation to what remains to be done in another work.

(1) There are some things which agree in a logical genus, but are diverse in natural genus. They are alike in logical genus because of a certain common character or nature or degree of perfection (*ratio, intentio*); they differ in natural genus (that is, as they are considered by the Natural Philosopher or the Metaphysician, who regard things as they are in nature, as they have *esse*) because of diverse modes of potency and matter.⁵³

(2) The considerations of the Logician and of the Natural Philosopher differ because the Logician gives only formal definitions,

⁵² *In VII Physic.*, lect. 8 #8.

⁵³ *In VII Physic.*, lect. 8 #8 (Leon. ed.); *S. T. I.* 88. 2 ad 4; 66. 2 resp. et ad 2; *In De Gen. et Corr.*, I. lect. 19 #5 (Leon. ed.); *In Boethii De Trinitate*, 6. 3 resp.

Only a few classic examples occur in the texts, such as the corruptible and the incorruptible in the genus of body and the material and the immaterial in the genus of substance. Concerning such examples and their significance for the problem of natural and logical genus we should make these two observations: (1) In dealing with the "incorruptible bodies" of Aristotelian physics, we do not in any way intend to take over the Aristotelian view of the nature of the heavenly bodies. The only question in such a discussion now is this: given for the sake of argument that there be such bodies, how would they be comparable with corruptible bodies? how would they fit into a general doctrine on the constitution of bodily substance? (2) The question of natural and logical genus, or of the analogy *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*, does not rest on the extreme cases of the agreement of the incorruptible and the corruptible in the genus body and of the material and the immaterial in the genus substance. These are extreme cases which recur in the texts as examples because they raise the problem so obviously. The same problem is involved in every case of a genus participated unequally by its species. This is indicated in the capital text *In VII Physic.*, lect. 8 #8: "*Quia ergo genus quodammodo est unum, et non simpliciter, iuxta genera latent multa: i.e. per similitudinem et propinquitatem ad unitatem generis, multorum equivocatio latet . . .*"

whereas the Natural Philosopher defines by indicating also the proper matter.⁵⁴ The considerations of the Logician and of the Mathematician are *abstract*, that of the Natural Philosopher is concrete.⁵⁵

(3) Diversity of genus according to the Logician is taken from diverse modes of predication; according to the Natural Philosopher and the Metaphysician it is taken from diverse *genus subjectum*⁵⁶ or matter.⁵⁷

(4) Genus *physice sumptum* is taken from matter; *logice*, from a common *ratio*.⁵⁸

(5) The question of natural and logical genus appears in another form in the analogy *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*,⁵⁹ named by Cajetan the analogy of inequality,⁶⁰ in which there is question of the unequal participation of the generic nature by the species.

It is clear even from this brief sketch that the problem of natural and logical genus cannot be treated satisfactorily by a mere citation of the capital texts. For the texts present many aspects of a complex question involving *genus subjectum*, logical and physical definition, the unity of genus and of the generic nature, agreement and diversity in genus, univocity and analogy, common and proper matter, and so forth. These questions can be resolved only by a study of the whole problem in the light of the formal objects and the methods of procedure of the sciences involved: Logic, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Metaphysics.

Not only must the problem be faced on these many fronts, but also, if we are to come to a full understanding of the problem of genus, we must deal with a history extending from Aristotle through Boethius, Avicenna, and Averroes to St. Thomas: a history in which classic errors and sharp divergencies occur. Constantly in this study, as in the limited study which we have made in this series, the whole doctrine of genus is determined in its causes by the kind of theory of matter and of the structure of material substance which we find in these philosophers.

For all the problems which we have studied spring from the same root: a substantial principle which is pure potency. Given material substance, with a substratum which potentially is all things in nature, and actually of itself is none of them, these problems and many others are born together with the first human intellect, faced toward and proportioned to such an object.

And of all the characteristics of our mode of knowledge there is one which is most proper and most troublesome. To it all the knowledges which we have studied are ordered. Upon it we can lay the blame for the length and perhaps deviousness of our study. It is the very *ratio* itself, the movement of reason, which must scatter its meagre light over so many dark pages.

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⁵⁴ In *Boethii De Trinitate*, 4. 2 resp.

⁵⁵ In *VII Physic.*, lect. 7 #9 (Leon. ed.).

⁵⁶ In *V Meta.*, lect. 22 #1127.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, X. lect. 4 #2019-2020.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, X. lect. 12 #2142.

⁵⁹ In *I Sent.*, 19. 5. 2 ad 1 (Mand. ed.), 492.

⁶⁰ Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, ed. Zammit (Romae: Institutum Angelicum, 1934) #3-7, pp. 4-10.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRISTIAN CRISIS by Michael de la Bedoyere. *Macmillan, 1942.*
Pp. 210.

Second in importance to the prosecution of the war is the planning for the post-war world which is being carried on by the nations of the world today. Responsible nations are assuming their legitimate responsibilities. But this activity of governments does not release Christian men from their obligation to inquire what might be their participation in world society in the face of the New Order and to conduct themselves accordingly. In *Christian Crisis*, Michael de la Bedoyere has questioned the effectiveness of the Christian in the post-war world.

The culture, traditions, and freedoms of Western Civilization are Christian culture, Christian traditions and freedoms. The Middle Ages saw the fullest flowering of that culture. It was soon to be blighted by the fourteenth-century divorce between Church and State, the sixteenth-century Reformation, the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and nineteenth-century Nationalism and false Humanitarianism. After World War I, Christianity had its opportunity to reassert itself as the guardian of Civilization, but World War II is evidence that Christianity did not seize the opportunity. Each responsible Christian must be prepared for the opportunity should it arise again. And this is precisely the key to M. de la Bedoyere's fine analysis of the crisis, which is the action of Christianity face to face with Dawnism, a belief that man will advance and progress if he is relieved of the shackles of religion, law, and custom—the last outposts of a defunct civilization.

M. de la Bedoyere's answer is, of course, the Catholic answer—a reaffirming of the integrity of the human person as a son of God, possessed of God-given rights, and a person who is not the pawn of the State, but rather to whom the State, with delegated authority, is responsible; all this in contradistinction to the plethora of secularist philosophies which have borrowed from Christianity sufficiently to be deceiving. “. . . the overlooked answer is to be found in the individual Christian who has so long been falling between two stools, the chair of Peter and the throne of Caesar, that the oneness of his personality has been forgotten” (p. 131).

The author has undertaken a dangerous task, namely, to convince the self-righteous of their error. But the self-righteous will take it and like it, for M. de la Bedoyere has made his shrewd analysis very convincing. And the call to reform is not despairing; consciously or unconsciously, all men of Western culture are striving for Christianity as a common end. For the values which Western man seeks today are products of Christianity and can alone be protected by Christianity. “Christianity alone preserves the fundamental truth that the good things of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, can have neither guarantee nor even meaning unless the world itself is rational and pregnant of good, and the existence of God alone can account for any faith in the rationality and goodness of the universe” (p. 201).

It would be well if the solution to the crisis were offered more definitively. It is true that Christian education is a very valuable means of reasserting in the concrete what it means to be a person, a son of God, a unit of organic Society, but is that acknowledgment enough?

Although the author has written for British Catholics, what he says will be engaging for Christians in this country as well, for M. de la Bedoyere's penetrating diagnosis can do much to clarify the nebulous state of American thought. *Christian Crisis* is an important book, which can be productive of much good, and is deserving of wide popularity.

RICHARD F. RYAN

INTELLIGENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD: JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY edited, with an introduction, by Joseph Ratner. Random House, 1939. Pp. xv + 1077. \$1.45.

CAPITAL, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO AND OTHER WRITINGS BY KARL MARX edited, with an introduction, by Max Eastman. Random House, 1932. Pp. xxvi + 429. \$.95.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE. Random House. Pp. xxxvii + 1095. \$1.45.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER edited, with an introduction, by Irwin Edman. Random House, 1928. Pp. xiv + 376. \$.95.

THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE by William James. Random House. Pp. xviii + 526. \$.95.

THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES AND THE DESCENT OF MAN by Charles Darwin. Random House. Pp. xvi + 1000. \$1.45.

Intelligence in the Modern World is a comprehensive presentation of Dewey's philosophy on all fronts, drawn from his own works and arranged systematically by the editor, Joseph Ratner. The position in the world of thought which Dewey has achieved lends an importance to this book. No one concerned with the future of philosophy in America should remain unacquainted with Dewey's work, and this volume removes many of the difficulties involved in attempting a thorough study of his writings. Thomists, if they are faithful to Aquinas' attitude toward gentile philosophy, will study Dewey not merely for the sake of counteracting his influence but also to profit by his many illuminating analyses of experience. The truly perennial philosophy is marked by its ability to draw nourishment and organic growth from without—from truth discovered by others in wholes or in parts, and also from errors: by understanding it and reclaiming the truth all error contains. A study of Dewey may haply quicken the scholastic's notions about existential philosophy, value, the dynamic role of philosophy in active life; it may also lead him to reconsider a number of things that need reconsidering.

Joseph Ratner's introduction, a book in its own right, deserves some mention. It is doubtless a reliable interpretation of what Dewey has been trying to do in philosophy. But it is fraught with those uncritical generalizations characteristic of the newer dogmatism—a type of philosophical malpractice common also in Dewey when he evaluates pre-modern systems, and one that contributes little toward the hoped-for *rapprochement*.

The burden of Mr. Ratner's plea is that to the method of experimentation in philosophy, "no valid alternative is possible." Now let us grant that there is no valid philosophy that is not inductive and that does not begin with experience and check itself with experience. Does it follow that philosophical truth must adopt the empirical pattern of hypothesis, rejection, substitution? So much has been written on the distinction between scientific and philosophic knowledge and the type of progress peculiar to each (for example, Maritain: *Preface to Metaphysics* and *Degrees of Knowledge*) that one grows impatient with attempts to justify the empirical method in philosophy merely by citing the advance of science against the fantasies of rationalist system-building and the pointless queries of epistemologists. The issue is not "experience" but whether or not there is only one method of using experience to obtain knowledge, and whether or not knowledge itself is, by the very nature of the mind and of reality, homogeneous. Mr. Ratner fails to demonstrate that it is, nor does he concern himself with the careful work of men like Gilson and Maritain who have insisted that it is not. It will take more than the "as Dewey says" so typical of his followers to convince us that, "There is nothing inherent in the nature of things that makes it possible for the method of experimentation—or of controlled inquiry—to be employed in certain

fields and nowhere else." If we leave it to the experimentalist, with his experimental methods, it seems rather naive to expect to find fields not subject to experimentation. Whether or not there are such fields is not a matter for the experimentalist to decide—nor to assume.

The volume *Capital* is an attempt to relieve Marxism of its metaphysical pretensions for the sake of the more positivistic Anglo-American mind. The editor, Max Eastman, would have the American student go to Marx as a teacher—not of a *Weltanschauung*, but of a scientific scheme for engineering class forces in erecting the desired society. The attempt to control social evolution by consulting the inner natures of things to find a goal consonant with these natures is repudiated for ". . . an engineering approach to the problems raised by Karl Marx. It separates the choice of a goal, *which is primarily an act of passion*, from the definition of existing facts and the discovery of their laws of motion; and it presents its plan of action as a plan of action pure and simple (p.x)." (Italics mine.)

The selections chosen in accordance with this plan are: An introduction to Marxism by Lenin; short excerpts setting forth Marx's notions of the ideal society and his theory of history; the text of *Capital* (Borchardt's abridgment, *The People's Marx*); the Communist Manifesto, a letter of instruction by Marx with an introduction by Engels, and another address by Marx—these last in Part III: "The Method and Call to Action."

In *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* are incorporated, unabridged, Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Genealogy of Morals*, *Ecce Homo*, and *The Birth of Tragedy*.

The Philosophy of Schopenhauer contains an abridged edition of *The World as Will and Idea*, and all of the essay, *The Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes*, with an introduction by the editor, Irwin Edman.

That it has been possible to publish these attractively and sturdily bound volumes for so little is something in itself. Unquestionably the Modern Library Series, motivated by the "Great Book" theory of education, is a boon to students and libraries. But while recognizing in principle that the best means of achieving a liberal education is by means of great books, it would be well to remember certain valid criticisms of the idea. If the end is simply mental growth through wrestling with the thoughts of the most influential writers of the past, well and good; but if the attainment of objective truth regarding the ideas themselves is aimed at—and the proponents of the "Great Books" believe in objective truth—then there are certain difficulties. The "idols of the theatre" may prove too formidable for anyone reading these books indiscriminately and without order, especially if he has no background of systematic philosophy and no competent teacher to guide him. The will to learn is not a touchstone of falsity and truth; a discursive acquaintance with all the influential thinkers from Plato to Dewey, even if not superficial, is as likely to produce the shallow eclectic or the sceptic as to fashion the fine, critical judgment that marks a truly educated man. Still this is not the concern of the publisher, and the Modern Library Series remains an enterprise of worth.

G. V. KENNARD

PSYCHOLOGIA by Vincent Remer, S.J. *The Newman Book Shop, Westminster, Md., 1942. Pp. xii + 331. (6th ed.)*

The teacher who is using a particular text-book would seem to be the logical person to review a new edition of the text. But if the students who were to have to use the book would write reviews, both authors and publishers of texts might learn a few startling facts.

Let it be clear at the outset that Fr. Remer's book is a *text book*, and not a *course* in psychology. Thus it demands a teacher who is capable enough to orientate and integrate the various steps, both in the light of metaphysics and with relation to the problems of psychology as they are actually encountered by the student. Without such a teacher this text

could easily become a burden rather than a help to advancement; with a real teacher, it possesses most of the qualities of an ideal text. It encourages one to go back to primary sources, to read around a problem, and thus to work it out for oneself. Such a procedure is preeminently necessary for any genuine learning, and this book is happily so constituted that it may well be the starting point for profound scholarship. It is not exhaustive, although it is quite complete. Even its completeness is not too apparent upon the first reading, but it merits to be reread several times; such a study will reveal that it contains all necessary matter, including accurate definitions. But it is not so organized as to be consumed at a superficial glance. However, real labor will show that an abundance of philosophic thought is immeshed in a somewhat stiff and cryptic Latin style.

It is surely evident, in times like the present, when stress is laid upon experimental psychology, that schools and universities whose courses still aim at getting at the heart of reality should welcome a text with so stimulating a presentation of the metaphysics of the intellectual and volitional processes of man. It seems that Fr. Remer's *Psychologia* should certainly be the standard text in Catholic seminaries. The importance of a profound metaphysical training in such lines, considering the positivistic preoccupation of modern thought, cannot be overestimated. This reviewer feels that the present volume is superior to any other text of Scholastic psychology. There are a few demerits, chief of which is the number of printing inaccuracies. A reprint of the book would do well to include an errata.

J. F. COLLINS

LITURGY AND PERSONALITY by Dietrich Von Hildebrand. *Longmans, Green and Company, 1943. Pp. 218. \$2.00.*

Much of contemporary thought gives us an impoverished reality whose values, whatever values men pretend to find in it, are projected upon it from without; Professor Von Hildebrand turns our gaze toward a far different reality, a reality in which the human spirit feels vastly more at home.

The liturgy is conceived as an intellectually awakened response to objective value—not, as the positivist would have it, the mere ritualizing of man's emotional response to the unknown. Needless to say, a fundamental postulate of the book is that value is not the arbitrary creation of the subject, but the ontological irradiation of the object. This postulate doubtless renders the author's analysis unacceptable to a large bloc of contemporary thinkers. But even so, anyone would benefit by seeing the coherence of the author's theory of personality and the entire liturgical pattern with their intellectualist philosophical background.

The author is sure of himself; clarity, profundity and precision characterize his analyses, and he never bogs down in liturgical detail. Rather, the liturgy is only treated after some essential element of human personality is disclosed whose adequate nurture is found to be some phase or character of the liturgical act. It is the spirit of the liturgy with which he is concerned, and it is the philosopher's and not the liturgist's approach that he adopts. True, the prime purpose of liturgy is not personality building. This the author establishes at the start. What he is after is—so far as the liturgy is concerned—a by-product: the impress left in human personality by participation in the liturgical life without this impress being consciously intended.

The analysis of personality is very satisfying. Here, too, the concern is for the central as opposed to the peripheral; it is the deep, basic elements of personality that are sought. Three of these personality values—"The Spirit of Communion," "The Spirit of Reverence," "The Spirit of Response-to-Value"—the author shows to have deep significance for any

vital, organic social unity: "It is a specifically liberal Protestant error to believe that the more a thing is peripheral, the more it leads towards the spirit of communion, and that, on the contrary, the deeper we are moved by something and the higher the value in question, the more we are plunged into solitude. The opposite is true. That which satisfies me alone, which bears only upon my own enjoyment, isolates. The world of authentic values, on the contrary, unifies. . . . An isolated man, one who has not become conscious of the ultimate objective link binding him to all other men before God, is an unawakened, immature, even a mutilated man. That liberal conception which considers the 'solitary' man as the great, profound, human being is the logical outcome of the understanding of communion as something peripheral in its nature." Here we have an example of how the author's inner vantage point, his concern with the substantial over the accidental, results in numerous observations that touch upon personality from other directions: social unity, friendship, marriage, and—of special interest to the educator—the mutual functions of the cognitive and appetitive powers in the growth of natural moral values.

Other constituents of genuine personality which the author describes are: the spirit of awakesness, openness to the irradiation of values; the spirit of "discretio" or the discernment of gradations and levels in an organic contact with the world of values; the spirit of continuity; the classical spirit.

The present tendency among philosophers to concern themselves with affective knowledge and with value judgments is a healthy trend. The student of value judgments will find very much to interest him in this book; so also will the metaphysician who likes to see the philosophy of man's ontological situation transferred to the level of appreciative knowledge. And anyone pained by the corrosive, value-levelling agencies at work in our mechanized culture, the cloying trivialities of swing, the disembodying of education, the new illiteracy and the pandering of press, screen and radio to the alleged thirteen-year-old mind, will find consolation in the author's account of true human values and the hope he brings of informing the individual personality with these values by living in the spirit of the liturgy.

G. V. KENNARD

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY by Peter Gabriel Bergmann. (Prentice-Hall Physics Series) *Prentice-Hall*, 1942. Pp. xvi + 287. \$4.50.

The celebrated Albert Einstein writes a Foreword for this work which is from the pen of one who was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, 1936-1941. Here, in close association with Einstein, he had full opportunity to quaff the waters of relativity at their fountain-head.

The purpose of the book is indicated in the title. The First Part explains the special theory of relativity, leading up to it by a lucid discussion of frames of reference, coördinate systems and coördinate transformations, classical mechanics and its applications to the special problems of electrodynamics. The bearing of the Special Theory on these problems and many others in classical physics is briefly but clearly outlined.

The student of physics and mathematics, for whom the work is intended, is expected by the author to have a familiarity with the calculus and some knowledge of differential equations, classical mechanics and electrodynamics. The tensor calculus is developed in the book itself. It is safe to say that the student will need all this equipment, if not more, in mastering the Second Part which deals with the General Theory of Relativity, and the Third Part whose three chapters discuss Unified Field theories. Nevertheless, the same quality of lucidity is evident here as throughout.

This book may be strongly recommended to any student who seeks a logical and systematic treatment of the special and the general theory of Relativity and of their experimental basis.

JAMES I. SHANNON

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